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ABSTRACT

This study examined a case of conflict between Federal
decision-makers and local citizens regarding the selection
of a clean-up plan for a coastal area contaminated by
hazardous wastes.

A prolonged dispute over remediation of

the New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site resulted in a series
of facilitated discussions intended to resolve the conflict.
A descriptive survey was used to explore the effect of the

discussions upon the risk perceptions of citizens and
managers, thereby examining the effectiveness of the
facilitated discussions in resolving conflict at the Site.
The study found that the facilitated discussions did not
cause risk perceptions to converge, . and concluded that the
discussions averted, rather than resolved, conflict between
citizens and managers at the New Bedford Harbor Superfund
Site.
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PREFACE

The research which is the subject of this paper was
carried out in 1994 and early 1995.

The descriptive survey,

by means of which the data was collected, was administered
in the Summer of 1994.
Survey administration was more difficult than expected.
The survey concerned a controversial issue; therefore, while
the cooperation of potential subjects was generally good,
passions and fear ran high at times.

New Bedford is not a

particularly easy place to survey, for the same reasons
Federal decision-makers have had difficulty communicating
there: its poverty and ethnicity.
Analysis turned out to be somewhat problematical, as
well.

The small size of three of the four study groups

meant that the statistical analyses had less power than
would have been optimal.

More significant, the study's

analytical results caused rejection -of not just the major
hypothesis, but some of the study's assumptions, as well.
Results therefore forced a reexamination of the problem
itself, rather than providing a simple resolution.
The landscape of Superf und has changed since the study
was conceived and the survey administered.

At the time of

this writing, the statute stands as described herein, and
the discussion of caselaw is current.

However, while the

103rd Congress was moving toward expansion of Superfund's
public participation requirements, the 104th is moving
iv

toward gutting environmental legislation, generally.

It

remains to be seen what shape, if any, Superfund takes in
the 104th Congress.
Regardless, it is hoped that the conclusions drawn
herein are pertinent, not just to Superfund, but to citizen
involvement in environmental decisionmaking, generally.
the extent that this hope is fulfilled,

To

I must thank Drs.

West, Nixon, and Hennessey, as well as the many people who
completed the survey.

To the extent that it is not, the

responsibility is mine, alone.

T. C. Ardito
Washington, D.C.
15 March 1995
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I.

I. A.

Introduction: The context of the problem.

The problem.

The siting of noxious facilities has become a most
intransigent problem for public environmental policy.
Nationally, the defeat of proposals to site such projects
has become more the rule than the exception (O'Hare and
Sanderson, 1993).
The case of the New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site
presents a timely example of the derailment of Federal
environmental policy as a result of opposition to the siting
of a "locally undesirable land use,'' or LULU.

Twice (first

in 1984, then again in 1994) residents of the New Bedford
area have forced the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (USEPA) to abandon or modify published remediation
plans for PCB-contaminated marine sediments in the Acushnet
River.

In August, 1994, yielding to public sentiment, USEPA

Region I cancelled a contract to incinerate the most
contaminated Acushnet sediments, in spite of a 1990 Record
of Decision (ROD) calling for incineration (Ciavettieri,
1994).

The cost of cancelling that one contract has not yet

been negotiated, but will undoubtedly be considerable
(MacNeil 1994).
Governmental and citizens' representatives have been
taking part in a series of facilitated discussions in an
attempt to reconcile their differences over the remediation
1

of New Bedford Harbor.

The success or failure of this

effort has bearing on the future of Superfund and on citizen
participation in governmental decisionmaking, generally.
This study examines the effectiveness of these facilitated
discussions in resolving perceptual differences between
citizens and managers, regarding the risks of the New
Bedford Harbor Superfund Site.

In so doing, it seeks to

illuminate the nature of the conflict itself, within the
context of risk perception and communication, regarding a
specific marine hazardous waste site in Southeastern
Massachusetts.

2

I. B.

New Bedford area: Geography.

I. B. 1.

Historical and economic geography.

The Acushnet River is a small estuary in Southeastern
Massachusetts, opening onto Buzzards Bay.

The mouth of this

estuary forms a well-protected harbor, New Bedford Harbor,
which has been used for commercial purposes since English
settlement in the early 18th Century.

By the mid-1700s, the

river had become an important center of shipbuilding and
whaling, and the towns on its banks--New Bedford, Acushnet,
and Fair Haven--prospered and grew. By the middle of the
19th Century, New Bedford had become the largest whaling
port in the world (Ellis 1892).
Manufacturing also began in the 18th Century in the New
Bedford area, albeit on a small scale.

During the

Nineteenth
Century, however, as the whaling trade began to decline, the
great capital which had been accumulated by whaling
interests began to be shifted into manufacturing; while
textile mills made up the most important segment of this
industry, a great diversity of production facilities arose
(Hegerty 1959) .

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries,

dozens of these vast mills were built in brick.

With the

mills came the tenements, or "triple-deckers:" three-story
frame structures built to house the laborers who, with their
families, migrated to New Bedford to fuel this industrial
expansion.

The mills--many vacant now, or partially so--and
3

the tenements dominate the areas surrounding the Acushnet
River to this day.
Architecture is not the only legacy which New Bedford's
industrial growth left upon the area's environment.

From

the 1940's until the late 1970's, manufacturers of
electrical equipment dumped industrial wastes into the
Acushnet River, New Bedford Harbor, and adjacent waters.
The wastes contained a number of toxic organic and inorganic
substances, including: polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs),
polyaromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), lead, cadmium, chromium,
and copper (Pruell et al. 1990; USEPA 1992c, 1989).
Resulting levels of contamination in estuarine sediments
ranged as high as 200,000 parts per million (ppm)

PCBs 1

(Fig. I.l) with metals concentrations as high as 4,000 ppm
(USEPA 1989a; USEPA 1992c).

Pruell et al.

(1990) have

stated that the Acushnet River may constitute the worst
instance of marine PCB pollution in the nation.

High

concentrations of PCBs and metals remain in the area's
marine biota while elevated levels of PCBs are present in
the air surrounding the most contaminated areas

(US EPA

1989b; USEPA 1992c) .

1

50 ppm PCBs is the concentration above which a substance
is considered toxic waste for purposes of the Toxic Substances
and Control Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 2601 et seq. See 40 C.F.R.
761.60 and 761.125.
4
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· Figure I.1:

Concentrations of PCBs in Acushnet sediments.
Source:
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USEPA, 1990c.

The contamination of the Acushnet River and New Bedford
Harbor has affected the towns adjoining the estuary in a
number of ways.

Since 1979 the harbor has been closed to

all fishing (Fig. I.2), while lobstering is illegal in over
18,000 acres of once-productive ground (USEPA 1992c).

Risk

assessments (RAs) commissioned by USEPA estimate the maximum
probable lifetime carcinogenic health risk resulting from
multiple-pathway exposure to ambient levels of PCBs in the
most contaminated area of the harbor at 3.65 in 1000 (USEPA
1989b) .

The same methodology finds that lifetime

carcinogenic risks from ingestion of New Bedford Harbor
seafood might range from 7 in 100 to 2.4 in 10,000,
depending upon the type of seafood and frequency of
consumption (USEPA 1992b) 2 •
Research suggests an economic dimension to the damage
resulting from the pollution, as well.

A study by the

National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
estimated total economic losses from New Bedford's PCB
pollution at $39.6 to $52.4 million, the result of fishing
and beach closures as well as reduced amenity values.

2

These high-end estimates presuppose almost impossible
circumstances.
The multiple-pathway RA assumes that an
individual would eat fish, ingest sediments, and come in
direct contact with sediments from the Hot Spot for her entire
life. The seafood RA is based upon the consumption of a PCBcontaminated lobster from the inner harbor, including the
tomalley (liver), every day of one's life.
6
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USEPA 1990b; 1992b.

Another study estimated that property values within two
miles of the contaminated waters had been reduced by a total
of $26.2 to $39 million (Grigalunas and Opaluch, 1989).

8

I. B. 2.

Sociodemographic characteristics.

In an era which has seen the flight of "smokestack
industry" from many of its former strongholds, contaminated
marine sediments are just one of an array of difficulties
faced by the towns adjoining the Acushnet River.

New

Bedford, in particular, is among the poorest municipalities
in Massachusetts; demographic statistics present a picture
of a metropolitan area which is disadvantaged in numerous
ways.
According to the 1990 Census, the population of New
Bedford totals 99,922, while Fair Haven and Acushnet have
populations of 16,132 and 9,554, respectively (US Department
of Commerce, 1992a).

New Bedford's median household income

in 1990 was $22,647, just 61% of the state median; median
household income in Fair Haven was $30,097, or 81% of the
state f igure 3 •

In 1990, 16.8% of New Bedford residents

lived below the official poverty level, nearly double the
state average.

Unemployment in that city was over 12%,

while less than half of residents over the age of 25
reported having finished high school, compared with the
state-wide average of 80% (US Department of Commerce, 1993
and 1992b) .
While New Bedford may be economically disadvantaged in
comparison to the rest of Massachusetts, the area has

3

Many of the census data which are available for New
Bedford and Fair Haven do not exist for Acushnet, a much
smaller municipality.
9

traditionally represented a gateway to opportunity for one
particular group: Portuguese immigrants.

The New Bedford

area has been a major center of immigration from Portugal
since the mid-19th Century (Cardozo 1976) .

The Census does

not separate the Portuguese from other European immigrants,
nor does it class those of Portuguese descent as "Hispanic,"
so it is difficult to estimate the number of Portuguese
immigrants and descendents in the New Bedford area.

The

importance of this ethnic group is suggested, however, by
the fact that nearly 30% of New Bedford residents, according
to the Census, speak Portuguese at home (US Department of
Commerce, 1992b).

Anecdotally, the Portuguese in New

Bedford are overwhelmingly islanders: mostly Azorean, with a
significant minority of Cape Verdeans, as well.

Recent

immigrants often work in the mills, in the fishing fleet, or
in the construction industries.
The problem of coastal contamination is particularly
relevant to a city such as New Bedford.

The boarded-up

mills remind us that the former economic development
paradigm, successful though it once was, is obsolete.

New

Bedford's extensive, underutilized waterfront, historic
architecture, and southeastern New England location would
seem to suggest a potential for the development of tourism.
It is obvious, however, that a harbor which is best known
for its concentrations of toxins is unlikely to have the
appeal necessary to provide the foundation for a burgeoning
tourism industry.
10

I.

c.

The New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site.

I. C . 1 .

Superfund: History and overview.

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) 3 created a comprehensive
program to address the problem of hazardous waste sites
nationwide.

As implemented in 1981, the program established

the National Priorities List (NPL), a list of sites most in
need of federal action, based on categorization under
CERCLA's Hazard Ranking System (HRS).

The law created the

Superfund, a $1.6 billion revolving fund, for use by USEPA
to remediate NPL sites (Hird 1993; Johnston and Nixon 1992)
In 1986, CERCLA was significantly revised and expanded
by the passage of the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) .

This legislation

increased the Superfund to $8.S billion, detailed stricter
site cleanup standards, and increased the role of the public
in Superfund decisionmaking.

While .Superfund has maintained

popularity with the public as well as with legislators, the
program has been shown to be economically inefficient as
well as socially inequitable.

Superfund cleanup

expenditures have been calculated as high as $77 billion per
statistical life saved for low-risk sites 4 , while the

3

As amended by SARA, 42 U.S.C. Sections 9601 et seq.

4

To put this figure in perspective, highway improvements
can save lives at a cost of $20,000 to $50,000 per statistical
life; while an American court, looking at an individual's
lifetime earnings in a wrongful death suit, might value a life
11

ultimate economic effect of Superfund--in spite of the law's
"polluter pays" intent--tends to be the redistribution of
public wealth toward more affluent communities as well as to
the new army of environmental professionals which the Act
has spawned (Hird 1993; Environmental Law Institute 1988)

I.

c.

2.

Policy history of the New Bedford Harbor Superfund
Site.

Elevated levels of PCBs in Buzzards Bay were discovered
by Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution in 1973; in the late
1970's and early 1980's, field_ studies by the State and
Federal Governments exposed widespread contamination
throughout the New Bedford Harbor area.

The highest

concentrations were in what has come to be known as the Hot
Spot, a 5-acre area located in the upper Acushnet River by
the site of the Aerovox, Inc., capacitor manufacturing
facility.

Sediment concentrations of PCBs in the Hot Spot

range from 4,000 - 200,000 ppm; toxic metals concentrations
are as high as 4,000 ppm.

In 1982 USEPA placed New Bedford

Harbor on the National Priorities List (NPL) ; the Superfund
Site now includes the Acushnet River, New Bedford Harbor,
and portions of Buzzards Bay (Fig. I.3)
divided into two "operable units''

(OUs) in order to create

sub-projects of manageable size.

at a million dollars or more (Lewis 1990).
12

It has since been

Fairhaven
Lower
Harbor

Upper
Buzzard's
Bay

North
Dartmouth

Figure I.3

The New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site.
Source
13

USEPA 1989a.

The Hot Spot comprises the first OU, while less contaminated
areas throughout the estuary, harbor, and upper bay comprise
the second (USEPA 1989a; 1992a; 1992c)

(Figs. I . 4, I . 5) .

In 1983, the Division of Waste Management, USEPA Region
I,

published its first plan concerning the Site, the

Remedial Action Master Plan (RAMP) .

Publication of the RAMP

was followed by the Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study
(RI/FS) required by CERCLA, resulting in a set of clean-up
options which USEPA presented to the public in 1984.
comments on the RAMP from other governmental entities, the
public, and "potentially responsible parties"

(PRPs) who

would have to pay for it were skeptical of the project's
ability to dredge contaminated sediments without
exacerbating the problem by dispersing the contamination.
In response to such criticism, USEPA contracted with
the US Army Corps of Engineers to conduct a full-scale
dredging pilot study in the Acushnet.

Yet another FS, along

with a comprehensive risk assessment . (RA), was completed in
the late 1980's; from this emerged, in 1989, USEPA's second
major remediation plan for the upper Acushnet, the Hot Spot
Proposed Plan (HSPP) .

This plan called for the dredging of

10,000 cubic yards (cy) of contaminated sediment from the
Acushnet River, which would be

11

dewatered 11 in engineered

shoreside basins, referred to by USEPA as confined disposal
facilities, or CDFs.

14

Hot
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Figure I.4:

Hot Spot Operable Unit.
Source
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Figure I.5:

Lower Harbor I Bay Operable Unit.
Source:
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USEPA 1992a .

The decanted solids would then be incinerated in a hazardous
waste incinerator5 temporararily assembled on the west bank
of the Acushnet.

The residual ash would be temporarily

stored in the CDFs, solidified if necessary.

The

incinerator and CDFs would be located at the foot of Sawyer
street, in the North End of New Bedford, an area, like much
of the city, of mills and tenements, largely residential.
According to the Hot Spot Proposed Plan, once the Hot
spot sediments were dredged and incinerated, USEPA would
move on to remediate the less highly contaminated areas of
the Superfund Site (USEPA 1989a) .

The Hot Spot Proposed

Plan was ratified by means of a Record of Decision (ROD)
which USEPA published in April, 1990, formally selecting the
dredging and incineration as the means of remediating the
contamination of the upper Acushnet River (USEPA 1989b)

In

1992, USEPA issued an "Explanation of Significant
Differences"

(ESD) which modified the ROD, stating that the

incinerator ash would be permanently, rather than
temporarily, stored in the shoreside CDFs at the foot of
Sawyer Street (USEPA 1992b).

Initially, the Hot Spot

remediation process was expected to take one year and to
cost approximately $14.3 million (USEPA 1989a); this figure
was revised to $16.1 million several years later when the
plan was modified by the ESD (USEPA 1992b; 1992c) .

5

Referred to, euphemistically, in the Hot Spot Proposed
Plan as a "thermal destruction facility."
17

In 1983 and 1984, the US Department of Justice filed
civil complaints against five of New Bedford's electrical
parts manufacturers for recovery of clean-up costs and
natural resource damages

(Casner et al. 1990).

The suits

were settled by a series of consent decrees from 1990 to
l992, in which the five PRPs agreed to pay a total of $110
million to USEPA.

Of this amount, $84 million would go

toward the cleanup; $20 million for restoration under
CERCLA's natural resource damages provision (42 U.S.C.
section 9607(f) (1)); and the difference to reimburse the
state and Federal Government for costs incurred (Allen
1992a; Garmon 1993).

18

Public involvement in the New Bedford Harbor

I. D .

Superfund Site.

The purpose of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)

(42

u.s.c. 9601 et seq.) is to provide USEPA with the means to
address sites contaminated by

hazardous substances, and to

broadly empower the Agency to recover costs from polluters
for cleanup of such sites (Williams 1993; Johnson 1990)
Within this framework, the Act seems to have an uneasy
regard for public participation in Superfund decisionmaking.

It requires a degree of public involvement in

USEPA's selection and implementation of CERCLA response 6
plans, but is less than unequivocal regarding the relative
importance of citizen input in the formulation of plans.
CERCLA contains provisions for citizen suits, but such suits
are subject to important jurisdictional limits.

The courts

have frequently been called upon to determine the specific
nature of these limits

~-

and therefore the degree to which

citizens have the right to challenge CERCLA response
decisions.

In most cases, Federal courts have held that

CERCLA deprives them of jurisdiction to hear any challenge,

6while the language of CERCLA distinguishes between
"removal" and "remediation" actions, such distinction is not
germane to this study; therefore, I will use "response" to
encompass both removal and remediation of hazardous wastes
Under CERCLA.
19

by any party, to cleanup activities at a Superfund site
until such activities have been completed.

I. D. 1.

Statutory requirements.

As amended, CERCLA requires USEPA to engage in a range
of public involvement activity in the process of cleaning up
a superfund site.

The Agency is required to solicit public

comments during the cleanup and to keep the public fully
informed throughout the process.

The Act authorizes the

Agency to provide citizen's groups with Technical Assistance
Grants (TAGs) of up to $50,000 . "to obtain technical
assistance in interpreting information" regarding almost any
aspect of a Superfund Site and its cleanup.

Among other

things, the TAGs are intended to "facilitate public
participation in the selection of [a] remedial action at the
facility" and to "facilitate public participation at all
stages of a remedial action"

(42 U.S.C. Sxn. 9617).

The law

requires USEPA to provide the public with "a reasonable
opportunity to comment and provide information about

[a]

plan" and "an opportunity for a public meeting in the
affected area."

It requires that USEPA respond to public

comments, but stops short of saying how much weight the
Agency should give public comment within the total Superfund
calculus (42 U.S.C. 9613(k)).

Unlike the National

Environmental Policy Act of 1968 (NEPA) , CERCLA does not
mandate public hearings per se.

20

CERCLA expressly grants

federal district courts "exclusive jurisdiction over all
controversies arising under this Act"

I. D. 2.

(42 U.S.C. 9613(b))

Case law pertaining to public participation in
Superfund.

In the event that a group of citizens or
environmentalists objects to a response decision by USEPA7 ,
that group would, conceptually, have three avenues of legal
recourse. Before the decision had been finalized,

the group

might seek to intervene in a consent decree between USEPA
and a polluter (potentially responsible party, or PRP, in
the language of CERCLA).

After the decision had been made,

the group might seek judicial review of a Superfund Record
of Decision (ROD) in an effort to obtain an injunction
against implementation of the remediation action.

Finally,

the group might challenge the constitutionality of the
statute itself.

All of these approaches have been tried in

Federal court, with varying

results~

ultimately, however, no

group has succeeded in blocking, by legal means, the
implementation of a Superfund remediation decision.

7

As has increasingly happened in recent years when USEPA
ha~ chosen to employ incineration to remediate contaminated
soils. Arguably, CERCLA/SARA as written failed to foresee the
subsequent proliferation of citizen suits seeking to block
USEPA remediation plans.
21

I. 0 . 2. a.

Intervention in Superfund consent decrees.

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act of 1980 provides for intervention as a
matter of right by "any person" who "claims an interest" in
a superfund action (42 U.S.C. 9613(i)).

In addition, Rule

24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for
intervention of right (Rule 24(a)) as well as permissive
intervention (Rule 24(b)) in cases before the district
courts.
A much-cited case concerning the ability of citizens'
groups and environmental organizations to intervene in
superfund consent decrees deals directly with the New
Bedford Harbor Superfund Site: In re Acushnet River and New
Bedford Harbor 8 ,

(Acushnet IV) . 9

In Acushnet IV, the

District of Massachusetts considered a motion entered by
USEPA and a PRP (AVX,

Inc., a New Bedford capacitor

manufacturer) to file a $2 million partial consent decree
for injury to the natural resources Df New Bedford Harbor.
The National Wildlife Federation (NWF) sought right of
permissive intervention, in order to argue for greater

8

722 F.Supp. 888

(D.Mass. 1989).

9

Acushnet IV is one of eight cases of the same title
concerning the New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site, considered
between 1987 and 1989 by Judge Young of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Massachusetts.
Of the eight, only
Acus~n~t IV and VI bear directly or indirectly upon public
Phart7c1pation; therefore, only these two will be discussed
ere1n.
22

damages than USEPA would receive under the proposed
settlement.
In its opinion, the District Court cited United States
g_ostal System v. Brennan,

10

to the effect that permissive

intervention is largely at the discretion of the District
court.

It then turned to the requirements of Rule 24(b),

finding the foremost to be timeliness.
were:

Other considerations

(1) the nature and extent of the intervenor's

interest;

(2) potential delay or prejudice to the rights of

the original parties;

(3) whether the applicant would

benefit from the intervention; - and (4) whether the
intervenors would contribute to equitable adjudication of
the suit. 11
In spite of the three years which had elapsed between
the filing of the suit and NWF's motion to intervene, the
Court found the application timely.

It pointed out that NWF

had had every reason to believe that its interests were
being represented by the sovereigns,. until the proposed
consent decree was announced.

At that point, the Court

observed, the difference between "the measure of damages
sought by the sovereigns as opposed to [that of] the
Federation" created a new interest "substantial" enough to
10

579 F.2d 188 (2nd Cir. 1978).

11

Citing Brennan and New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v.
United Gas Pipe Line, 732 F.2d 452, (5th Cir.) (en bane) cert .
denied sub nom. Morial v. United Gas Pipe Line Co. 469 U.S.
1019, 105 S.Ct. 434, 83 L.Ed.2d 360 (1984), as well as
S~angler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 552 F.2d 1326 (9th
Cir. 1977) .
23

justify intervention.

The District Court's oft-cited

rationale for this liberal interpretation of the timeliness
requirement was that
[t]o do otherwise would promote a sort of
prophylactic intervention whereby parties would be
compelled to intervene in matters simply to
protect their rights to participate in those
matters ... downstream ... Such a result would
obviously be expensive and inefficient.
Permitting parties like the Federation to
intervene keeps the number of parties in a dispute
at a minimum unless and until a real divergence of
interests arises.
The Court therefore allowed NWF to intervene.
A final settlement of $12.6 million between USEPA, AVX,
and one other PRP, Belleville, was approved by the District
Court in 1991 over NWF's objections.

The Federation brought

appeal before the First Circuit in United States v. AVX
Corporation 12 ,

seeking to argue that the consent decree

violated CERCLA's requirements.

The Court held that it

could not consider such substantive issues because,

in the

wake of a settlement by the original parties, NWF's appeal
was rendered moot by the Federation's inability to satisfy
the prevenient issue of standing.
The First Circuit cited the US Supreme Court in Diamond
v. Charles 13 to demonstrate an appellant's need to show
independent standing following settlement of a suit in
district court.

In

Diamond, Justice Blackmun stated that

"an intervenor's right to continue a suit in the absence of
12

962 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1992).

13

476 u .s . 54

I

10 6 s . Ct . 16 9 7
24

I

9 0 L . Ed . 2 d 4 8

( 19 8 6 ) .

the party on whose side intervention was permitted is
contingent upon a showing by the intervenor that he fulfills
the requirements of Art . III."

The appellate court then

cited a number of other Supreme Court cases in order to
define such standing.
wright,

14

Calling in particular upon

Allen v.

the Court observed that standing required a

"distinct and palpable" injury which was "fairly traceable"
to the alleged actions of the defendant.
The First Circuit pointed out that such injury could be
aesthetic or environmental as well as physical or
economic. 15

But due to Article . I I I's limitation that the

courts hear only "cases or controversies," the injury must
be a factual one, "something more than an academic exercise
in the conceivable"

(citing SCRAP).

The appellate court

found that while "[t]here is no question that the interests
which NWF seeks to protect are 'germane to the
organization's purpose' " 16 the Federation could not show the
type of "'concrete injury' ... needed .to confer standing in an
environmental suit". 17

Rather, the Court found NWF' s claim

that its "79,000 members and supporters in Massachusetts"
~ 468 U.S.

737, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556

(1984).

15

Citing the landmark environmental cases United States v.
Students Challenging Regulatory Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S.
669, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 37 L.Ed.2d 254 (1973) and Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 92 S.Ct. 1361~ 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972).
16c.

.
it1ng
Hunt v. Washington State Aoole Advertising
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 33, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977).
11c.

•

R .
it1ng, accord, Conservation Law Foundation of N.E. v.
e1lly, 950 F.2d 38 (1st Cir. 1991).
25

"have been and will continue to be harmed by [PCB] releases"
in New Bedford Harbor inadequate.

"NWF," it observed,

"makes only the most nebulous allegations regarding its
member's identities and their connection to the relevant
geographic area ... Gauzy generalities of this sort,
unsubstantiated by any factual foundation, cannot survive
[the original litigants'] motion to dismiss."
Like the Acushnet IV court, district and appellate
courts nationwide have found timeliness to be the threshold
consideration for intervention in CERCLA consent decrees 18 •
with respect to Acushnet IV's second requirement, that the
would-be intervenor show injury-in-fact, a number of
subsequent opinions have used the precedent of New Orleans
Public Service, Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line, supra, to
distinguish between a mere "economic interest" and one which
is "legally protectable," and thus adequate to establish the
right to intervene. 19
Once a party has shown that its request for
intervention has satisfied the two requirements set forth in
Acushnet IV, a court may review a Superfund consent decree.
In recent years, the dominant standard for such review has
S ee, e.g., B1 oomington
.
. h ouse E 1 ectric
. Corp.,
v. Westing
824 F.2d 531, 17 E.L.R. 21185 (7th Cir. 1987); United States
v. Acton Corp. on behalf of Vikoa, 131 F.R.D. 431 (D.N.J.
1990); United States v. Bliss 132 F.R.D. 58 (E.D.Mo. 1990);
Dr:ited States v. BASF-Inmont Corp., 819 F.Supp. 601 (E.D.
Mich . 1993) .
18

19

See, e . g. ,Acton and Bliss, op cit. note 12, as well as
United
1993), States v. ABC Industries 153 F R D 603 (W D Mi' ch
.

I
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•

•

•

•

•

•

been the three-prong test set forth by the Sixth Circuit in
yPited States v. Azko Coatings of America, Inc. 20 : that the
consent decree be fair, reasonable, and consistent with the
goals of CERCLA (Johnson 1993).

I. D. 2. b.

Challenges to remedial decisions.

Like much Federal environmental legislation, CERCLA as
amended by SARA contains express provision for citizen
suits, assigning jurisdiction over such controversies to the
district courts:
(a) AUTHORITY TO BRING CIVIL ACTIONS. -- Except as
provided ... in section 9613(h) ... any person may
commence a civil action on his own
behalf ... against any person (including the United
States ... ) who is alleged to be in violation of
any standard, regulation, condition, requirement
or order [made] pursuant to this
chapter ... or ... against the President or ... the
Administrator of [USEPA] ... where there is alleged
a failure ... to perform any act or duty under this
chapter .. .
(c) RELIEF. -- The district court shall have
jurisdiction ... (42 U.S.C. 9659) .
While a party could clearly make use of this provision to
force USEPA to initiate action at a hazardous waste si te 21 ,
it has proven to be of little use to groups wishing to
contest Superfund remediation decisions.

The principal

reason for this is that CERCLA Section 9613(h) has been held

W949 F.2d 1409, 22 E.L.R. 20405 (6th Cir. 1991).
21

See . e . g., U. s. E. P.A. v.
917 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1990)
27

Environmental Waste Control,

to establish strict jurisdictional limits on challenges to

USEPA'S Superfund decision-making:
(h) TIMING OF REVIEW. -- No Federal court shall
have jurisdiction under Federal law other than
under section 1332 of title 28 of United States
Code (relating to diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction) or under State law ... relating to
cleanup standards ... to review any challenges to
removal or remedial action selected under section
9604 [removal and remedial actions] ... in any
action except one of the following .. .
(4) An action under section 9659 (relating to
citizen suits) alleging that the removal or
remedial action taken under section 9604 of
this chapter or secured under section 9606 of
this title was in violation of any
requirement of this chapter. Such an action
may not be brought with regard to a removal
where a remedial action is to be undertaken
at the site (42 U.S.C. 9613) (emphasis
added).
Exception (4) to the jurisdictional bar of 9613(h) has
been a pivotal issue in CERCLA citizens' suits.
Specifically, controversy has adhered to the precise meaning
of "removal," and the question of exactly what time limit is
implied by the construction "is to be undertaken."

The

ambiguity of 42 U.S.C. 9613(h) (4) has forced Federal courts
to repeatedly revisit the legislative history of the
CERCLA/SARA.

Typically, courts have held that 9613(h) bars

any attempt to block or alter USEPA's Superfund cleanup
decisions; that is, a remedial action cannot be challenged
under the citizen suit provision until it has been
completed.

Moreover, this jurisdictional bar has generally

been held to be comprehensive in scope, preventing not only
direct challenges to USEPA remediation plans, but challenges
to parts of plans, as well as suits brought under other
28

environmental laws which might have bearing upon CERCLA
.

actions.

22

once a court does review a ROD, the language of CERCLA
limits judicial review to the administrative record:
( j ) JUDICIAL REVIEW.

(1) LIMITATION.
. .. any judicial action
under this chapter ... shall be limited to the
administrative record ...
(2) STANDARD. -- ... the court shall uphold
[USEPA's] decision in selecting the response
action unless the objecting party can
demonstrate, on the administrative record,
that the decision was arbitrary and
capricious or otherwise not in accordance
with the law (42 U.S.C. 9613).
Though no suit was ever brought under Section 9613
regarding USEPA's plans at the New Bedford Harbor Superfund
Site, the applicability of this standard to that case was
verified by the District of Massachusetts in In re Acushnet
River & New Bedford Harbor: Proceedings re Alleged PCB
Pollution23 (Acushnet VI).

Important precedents for the

District Court in this instance were two suits brought by
PRPs, in which district courts found only the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard of review was appropriate to CERCLA
challenges. 24

nThe exception of United States v. State of Colorado, 990
F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied 127 L.Ed.2d 216, 114
S.Ct. 922, infra, is notable, but arguably a special case.
The outcome of Colorado hinged on the determination that a
state has the right to enforce its own hazardous waste law
(enacted, in this case, pursuant to RCRA) at a Superfund site.
n722 F.Supp. 888

(D.Mass. 1989)

24

United States v. Seymour Recycling Corp., 679 F. Supp.
~59 (S.D.Ind. 1987) and United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 669
.Supp. 672 (D.N.J. 1987).
29

The jurisdictional bar of CERCLA section 9613(h) was
written into the law with the 1986 SARA reauthorization .
According to Williams (1993), it appears to be a
codification by Congress of a decision reached by the
District of New Jersey in Lone Pine Steering Committee v .

u.s. E.P.A .. ~

In Lone Pine, a group of PRPs brought suit

against USEPA, seeking to block a ROD relating to the
closure of a landfill which had been placed on the National
Priorities List (NPL) 26 as a result of the illegal dumping
there of hazardous wastes. 27

The plaintiffs claimed that

USEPA's closure plan was unnecessarily elaborate and wished
to implement a cheaper one, which they argued no less
adequate, in order to avoid potential liability under CERCLA
for the more expensive plan.

The District Court examined

questions of jurisdiction and scope of review.

~600 F.Supp 1487 (D.N.J. 1985), affirmed 777 F.2d 882, 23
Envt . Rep.Cas. 1568, 16 E.L.R. 20009, (3rd Cir . ), cert . denied
4 7 6 u. s . 1115
9 0 L . Ed . 2 d
6 54
106
S.Ct.
1970,
25
Envt.Rep.Cas . 1744.
I

I

uPlacement on the NPL is among the first steps toward
cleanup of a hazardous waste site under CERCLA: see 42 U . S.C .
Section 9605.
27

While the focus of this study is on public participation
and while the Sxn. 9613(h) (4) exception
which most concerns us relates to citizen suits, there a good
deal of precedential overlap between CERCLA challenges brought
by.citizens, PRPs, and state governments.
Therefore, while
thi~ discussion will center upon citizen suits, relevant
actions brought by other types of parties must be mentioned,
as well.
an~ citizen suits,

30

citing the US Supreme Court in Block v. Community
Nµtrition Institute, 28 the Court noted that the extent to
which a statute precluded judicial review was determined not
only by the language of the law, but by its structure and
nature, as well as its legislative history.

Delving into

CERCLA's history as well as the law's intent, the District
court concluded that
both the legislative history and the language of
CERCLA suggest that to allow judicial review of a
ROD by an entity which may (or may not) be the
subject of a subsequent recovery action would
frustrate Congress' intent to provide a mechanism
whereby hazardous sites can be neutralized
expeditiously.
Moreover, the Court found, some of the events of this
particular case were "suggestive of the bog into which
courts would descend if CERCLA were interpreted to permit
[PRPs] to obtain judicial review of the issuance of a ROD."
The Court also considered the limited precedent which
had developed following the passage of the 1982 law, citing
opinions which had found that courts lacked jurisdiction to
review PRP claims brought to enjoin Superfund cleanup
activities. 29

Conversely, the Court considered and

disagreed with J.V. Peters v. Ruckelshaus, 30 wherein the
Northern District of Ohio had held that PRPs did indeed have

D467 U.S. 340, 104 S.Ct. 2450, 81 L.Ed.2d 270 (1984).
2

9united States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 104 F.Supp. 405
(N.D.Ill. 1984) and Aminoil v. United States Environmental
Protection Agency, 599 F.Supp. 69 (D.Calif. 1984).
~584 F.Supp. 1005 (N.D.Ohio, 1984), affirmed 767 F.2d 263
(6th Cir. 1985).
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the right to obtain judicial review of a Superfund ROD. The
~eter...§.

court had ruled the issuance of a ROD by USEPA a

"final administrative action" subject to judicial review
under CERCLA; moreover it found the PRPs' potential
liability for the clean-up to comprise the "actual or
threatened injury" required to establish standing under
Article III. 31

The reasoning which the Lone Pine court

relied upon to reject the precedent of Peters has become a
fundamental justification for denying PRPs review of USEPA
RODs: that the PRPs will have the opportunity to state their
case in the subsequent CERCLA cost recovery suit, and that
therefore the ROD is not in and of itself "a final agency
action."

In the words of the Court:

[There is] no reason why plaintiffs cannot raise
as a defense in a cost recovery action every
objection to the ROD which they could legitimately
raise in a judicial proceeding at this time.
The plaintiffs' motion was accordingly dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
It is important to note that the reasoning which the
District Court employed in Lone Pine would not fully apply
to citizens' suits, since unlike PRPs, citizens do not have
the subsequent opportunity to state their case in a cost
recovery suit, and because monetary damages are
fundamentally different from claims of health impacts.

31Ul

.
timately,
however, the Peters court dismissed
PRPs' suit for failure to state an actionable claim.

32

The

the

Pine court acknowledged as much when it stated, dictum,

k_l.,!.!o~n~eS:.-:..==---

that
the statute may contemplate a different rule of
judicial review in the case of a victim of a
hazardous waste site. The statute is designed
particularly to protect such persons and, unlike
the persons responsible for the hazardous waste,
no specific provision is contained in the statute
under which they can obtain judicial review ... In
any event, it is unnecessary to resolve that
question now.
In codifying the decision of the Lone Pine court by means of
CERCLA Section 9613(h) in the SARA reauthorization, Congress
did nothing to clear up the ambiguity which the Court had
alluded to.

Since the passage - of SARA, therefore, courts

have been forced to grapple with the meaning of Section 9613
and its applicability to citizens' suits. 32
Two Federal cases heard soon after the passage of SARA
have become important precedents regarding this question,
although each took an opposite view of the issue: Cabot
Corp. v. United States Environmental Protection Agencv3 3 and
Alabama v. United States Environmental Protection Agency. 34
In Cabot, PRPs attempting to block a CERCLA ROD sued as
citizens.

The PRPs argued that under the 42 U . S . C.

9613 (h) (4) exception, citizens' suits were eligible for pre-

32

The Third Circuit, in U.S. v. Princeton Gamma-Tech,
Inc., 31 F.3d 138 (3rd. Cir. 1994), called the legislative
history of 9613 (h) (4) "confusing" and the citizens' suit
provision "a troublesome one."
D677 F . S upp. 8 2 3, 1 8 E . L.R. 20835

(E .D.Pa. 1988 ) .

M871 F.2d 1548, 19 E.L.R. 20956 (11th Cir . 1989) cert.
denied 493 U.S. 991, 107 L.Ed.2d 535, 110 S.Ct. 538, appeal
after remand 925 F.2d 385, 21 E.L.R. 21026 (11th Cir).
33

enforcement review.

The Court examined the language and

legislative history of CERCLA in order to evaluate the
claim.

While deciding that the PRPs were ineligible to

masquerade as citizens for the purpose of employing the
exception, the Court did find, dictum, that some of the
legislative history of CERCLA/SARA "emphasized the
distinction between suits focusing on health or
environmental concerns and suits alleging monetary harm" in
terms of judicial review .

Therefore, the District Court

concluded, in the case of a true citizens' suit, Section
9613(h) (4)

"arguably permits challenges to EPA's plans even

before they have been implemented."

The dictum of the Cabot

court has been used by citizens as well as PRPs in
subsequent cases to argue for judicial review of Superfund
response actions, in each case without success.~
The Cabot court rejected, as well, PRPs' claim that the
ROD was separable from "removal or remedial action" within
the context of CERCLA.

The idea that each individual aspect

of a CERCLA response action is, in and of itself, a "removal
or remedial action," protected by the Section 9613(h)
jurisdictional bar, has proven to be most significant to the

35

R .
See, e.g. , Neiohborhood Toxic Cleanup Emergency v.
eill~, 716 F.Supp. 828, 19 E.L.R. 21165 (D.N.J. 1989); U.S.
~- Princeton Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d 138 (3rd Cir. 1994); and

1 ~nford
93) .

Downwinders v.

Dowdle,
34

841 F.Supp.

1050

(E.D.Wash.

case law of CERCLA, and has been shared by many courts which
have examined the Act . 36
In Alabama v. United States Environmental Protection
agency, 37 the Eleventh Circuit came to a very different
conclusion than did Cabot regarding the eligibility of
citizens' suits for judicial review.

In this instance,

officials of the State of Alabama brought suit as private
citizens to enjoin shipment of hazardous wastes from a
superfund Site in Texas to a treatment facility in Alabama.
The District Court had granted a preliminary injunction and
USEPA appealed, with Texas intervening.
Inter alia, the Court considered the plaintiffs' claim
that they were entitled to more meaningful involvement in
USEPA's decision-making than they had been allowed.

The

plaintiffs argued that two statutes established Federal
jurisdiction to compel compliance with CERCLA:

(1) under

CERCLA, the Section 9659 citizens' suit provision and the
Section 9613 granting of jurisdiction to the district
courts; and (2) the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5

36

E. g. Cooper Industries, Inc . v. United States EPA, 775
F.Supp.
1027,
34 Envt.Rep.Cas.
1290,
22 E.L.R.
20608
(W.D . Mich. 1991); Environmental Waste Control, Inc. v. Agency
for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, 763 F.Supp 1576, 33
Envt.Rep.Cas. 1297, 21 E.L.R. 21380 (N.D.Ga. 1991); North
Shore Gas v. EPA 930 F. 2d 1239, 32 Envt. Rep. Cas . 2049, 21
E.L.R. 21038 (7th Cir. 1991); and In re Hanford Nuclear
Reservation Litigation, 780 F.Supp. 1551, 34 Envt.Rep.Cas.
1145, 22 E.L . R . 20703 (E.D.Wash. 1991).
TI871 F.2d 1548, 19 E.L . R. 20956 (11th Cir. 1989) cert.
denied 493 U.S. 991, 107 L.Ed.2d 535, 110 S.Ct. 538, appeal
after remand 925 F.2d 385, 21 E.L.R. 21026 (11th Cir.).
35

u.s.c.

section 701 et seq., which provides, inter alia, that

a "person suffering legal wrong ... or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action ... is entitled to judicial
review."
The Alabama court first examined the language of 42

u.s.c.

9613(h) (4), allowing for judicial review of citizens'

actions only after a remedial action has been "taken" or
"secured." It cited the U.S. Supreme Court in Consumer
Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 38 to the
effect that the language of a statute is conclusive
"[a]bsent clear legislative intent to the contrary;"

based

on the plain language of Section 9613(h) (4), the Court found
the statute to require that the remedial action be complete
before a case might be heard.
Turning next to the CERCLA's legislative history, the
Eleventh Circuit, unlike the Cabot court, found it
supportive of the idea that the statute barred judicial
review of citizen suits until the completion of a CERCLA
response action.

In light of the delay which inevitably

attends lawsuits, the Court emphasized the importance of its
observation that "the primary purpose of CERCLA is the
prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites."

The Alabama court

acknowledged Cabot but emphasized the precedent of Lone
Pine, finding that both the language and intent of CERCLA
barred precompletion judicial review of Superfund cleanup

~447 U.S. 102, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980).
36

actions.

It rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the ROD

was an a ction "taken" within the meaning of CERCLA, thus
eligible for challenge under the 9613 (h) (4) exception;
moreover, based on CERCLA's legislative history, the Court
found that the broad jurisdictional bar of Section 9613
applied equally to the plaintiffs' APA claim.
The Eleventh Circuit, therefore, reversed the finding
of the District Court and dismissed the case for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction.

The Alabama decision, denied

certiorari by the Supreme Court, has probably been the
single most important precedent in the subsequent
development of CERCLA/SARA case law.

It used case law

dealing with PRP claims to apply CERCLA's jurisdictional bar
to true citizen suits, thus extending the scope of the
9613 (h) ( 4) prohibition.
The emphasis of the Alabama opinion on CERCLA's
prioritization of an expeditious clean-up, as well as its
finding that a remedial action must .have been completed
before it may be reviewed, has been used by numerous courts
to rebuff plaintiffs' attempts to challenge Superfund
remediation

decisions.~

Not all courts which have examined

~See, e.g., Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 20 E.L.R.
20669, reh. den., en bane, (7th Cir. 1990) cert. denied Frey
v . Reilly, 498 U.S. 981, 112 L.Ed.2d 521, 111 S.Ct. 509, reh.
den. 498 U.S. 1074, 112 L.Ed.2d 863, 111 S.Ct. 802; In re
Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litigation, 780 F.Supp. 1551, 34
Envt.Rep.Cas. 1145, 22 E.L.R. 20703 (E.D.Wash. 1991); Arkansas
~eace ~enter v. Dept. of Pollution Control, 999 F.2d. 1212
8th Cir. 1993) cert . denied 128 L.Ed . 2d 70, 114 S.Ct. 1397,
62 U.S.L.W. 3657; Hanford Downwinders v. Dowdle, 841 F.Supp.
lOSO (E.D.Wash. 1993) .

37

its precedent, however, have been as comfortable that the
language and legislative history of Section 9613 precluded

citizen cha 11 enges

t

. 1 ac t 'ions. ~
o reme d ia

Just a year after it denied the Eleventh Circuit's
b)..abama decision certiorari, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari of a similar decision by the Seventh Circuit in
Schalk v. Rei· 11 y. 41

This case concerned suits brought by

local residents seeking to prevent USEPA from incinerating
PCB-contaminated wastes as part of a Superfund cleanup in
Bloomington, Indiana.

The District Court had dismissed the

cases separately, finding that _they sought the type of preenforcement review barred by CERCLA; the Court of Appeals
heard a consolidated appeal.

As in Lone Pine, supra, the

plaintiffs in Schalk claimed that USEPA had, inter alia,
violated NEPA, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., by selecting
incineration as a remedy without adequate public hearings or
an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).

They argued that,

in challenging the consent decree wherein USEPA chose the
contested remedy, they were challenging an "action taken"

40

In U.S. v. Princeton Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d 138 (3rd Cir.
1994), the Third Circuit stated, dictum, that a district court
might be able to grant an injunction under 42 U.S.C.
9613(h) (4) where citizens could show an imminent threat of
"irreparable harm to public health or the environment.
C.f.
Arkansas Peace Center v. Dept. of Pollution Control, op cit.
note 3 and Neighborhood Toxic Cleanup Emergency v. Reilly, 716
F.Supp. 828, 19 E.L.R. 21165 (D.N.J. 1989).
419
.
00 F.2d 1091, 20 E.L.R. 20669, reh. den., en bane, (7th
Cir. 1990) cert. denied Frey v. Reilly, 498 U.S. 981, 112
L.Ed.2d 521, 111 S.Ct. 509, reh. den. 498 U.S. 1074, 112
L.Ed.2d 863, 111 S.Ct. 802.
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within the meaning of CERCLA; thus theirs was a postenforcement challenge, to which the District Court had
improperly applied the Section 9613(h) denial of preenforcement review.
The Court of Appeals did not agree.

Relying on the

plain language of CERCLA, the Seventh Circuit found that
"[t]he obvious meaning of this statute is that when a remedy
has been selected, no challenge to the cleanup may occur
prior to completion of the remedy."

The Court leaned

heavily upon the precedent of Alabama to bolster its
argument; since its decision was based primarily upon the
language of the statute, it made only the most cursory
examination of SARA's legislative history.

It dismissed the

plaintiffs due process claims with little more than a wave
of the hand, and affirmed the decisions of the District
Court.
Subsequent decisions regarding CERCLA's citizen-suit
provisions have been generally consistent with the opinions
of Alabama and Schalk, finding that 42 U.S.C. 9613(h) (4)
expressly bars judicial review of a Superfund clean-up until
such action has been completed. 42

As recently as 1993,

however, an Arkansas district court came to the opposite

42

E.g. In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litigation, Q2
cit.; Reynolds v. Lujan, 785 F.Supp. 152 (D.N.M. 1992);
Redland Soccer Club v. Dept. of Army, 801 F.Supp. 1432
{M.D.Pa. 1992); Heart of America Northwest v. Westinohouse
Hanford, 820 F.Supp. 1265 {E.D.Wash. 1993). A notable recent
exception is U.S. v. Princeton Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d 138 {3rd
Cir. 1994): see note 34.
•
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conclusion in a case involving a Superfund clean-up quite
similar to that of New Bedford.

Overruled by an appellate

decision which was, like Alabama and Schalk, denied
certiorari by the Supreme Court, Arkansas Peace Center v.
Dept. of Pollution Control 43 stands as yet another statement
of the federal courts' unwillingness to review USEPA's
superfund remediation decisions.
In Arkansas Peace Center, a citizens' group attempted
to take advantage of the Colorado precedent by using a RCRA
claim to block the incineration of dioxin-contaminated waste
at the controversial Vertac incinerator in Arkansas.

The

subject of their action was a USEPA ROD which chose
incineration as the selected remedy for some 28,000 drums,
containing two types of dioxin, at an abandoned herbicide
and pesticide plant.
The group had brought suit in Federal District Court,
alleging inter alia that USEPA was in violation of RCRA, 42
U.S.C. 6901 et seq., insofar as it had failed to demonstrate
that its incinerator would meet its own standard for dioxin
removal efficiency.«

The District Court stated that it had

jurisdiction to consider no more than defendants' compliance
with USEPA's regulations; in so doing, however, the Court

43

999 F.2d. 1212 (8th Cir. 1993) cert. denied 128 L.Ed.2d
70, 114 S.Ct. 1397, 62 U.S.L.W. 3657.
«The

so-called "six nines" requirement,
40 C.F.R.
which mandates that certain hazardous waste
incinerators must achieve a destruction and removal efficiency
(DRE) of 99.9999%.

~64: 343 {a) (2),
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found that a violation had occurred.

Given a probability

that the plaintiff would succeed on the merits, and that "a
violation of regulations tips the scale heavily toward a
determination that potential irreparable harm to plaintiffs
outweighs the potential harm to defendants," the District
court granted a preliminary injunction to prevent
incineration of the wastes.

Defendants appealed.

The Eighth Circuit ruled that the District Court had
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to grant injunction,
basing its determination on the plain language of CERCLA as
well as the now-considerable citizen-suit case law.

The

court of Appeals cited Alabama to support its judgement that
citizens' suits were barred until the completion of a CERCLA
response action, and Schalk to the effect that challenges to
the response based on other environmental laws would result

in the same delays that Congress sought to prevent as would
challenges based on CERCLA itself.

The Court considered

plaintiffs' example of Colorado, but. found that CERCLA's
explicit protection of states' rights to enforce their own
environmental laws distinguished it from the case at bar.
The Court of Appeals, therefore, reversed the District
Court's granting of preliminary injunction, and remanded the
case.
Unlike many similar sites, New Bedford Harbor was never
the subject of a citizen suit.

Had the citizens who

objected to USEPA's ROD attempted to use CERCLA's citizen
suit provisions to block the incineration, case law
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demonstrates that they probably would have failed as a
result of the 9613(h)

jurisdictional bar.

Some district

courts have clearly been uncomfortable with this bar, but
they have been reigned in by courts of appeals, whose
decisions, in turn, have been denied certiorari by the US
supreme Court.

CERCLA's citizen-suit provisions, as

interpreted by the judiciary, appear to offer scant recourse
for citizens who would contest a USEPA Superfund remediation
decision.

I. D. 2. c.

Constitutional challenges to CERCLA.

Throughout the case law of CERCLA, citizens' groups and
PRPs seeking to contest CERCLA response actions have argued
that the Constitutional right to due process is superior to
the jurisdictional bar of 42 U.S.C. Section 9613(h) .~
Generally speaking, however, courts which have specifically
considered this issue have held that the section's denial of
pre-enforcement judicial review encompasses Constitutional
claims.

In Lone Pine Steering Committee v. U . S.E.P.A.,

supra, and Neighborhood Toxic Emergency v. Reilly, supra,
for example, district courts stated explicitly that the
jurisdictional bar of 42 U.S.C. 9613(h) prevented them from
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See, e.g., J.V. Peters v. Ruckelshaus, 584 F.Supp. 1005
(N.D.Ohio, E.D.1984); U.S. v. Sevmour Recycling Corp., 679
F.Supp. 859 (S.D.Ind. 1987); Lone Pine Steering Committee v.
U.S.E.P.A, supra; Alabama v. United States Environmental
.E..r~tection Agency, supra; and Neighborhood Toxic Emergency v.
Reilly, supra.
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hearing Constitutional claims related to ongoing CERCLA
cleanups.
In 1991, however , the First Circuit allowed a
constitutional claim to stand in a CERCLA case: Reardon v .
u.s.~

=---

Reardon concerned a hazardous waste site to which

USEPA had attached a lien in order to recover response
costs, in accordance with 42 U.S.C. 9607, CERCLA's section
on "Liability."

Reardon, landowner and PRP, brought suit in

District Court to argue that the lien should be removed from
the property.

Two of the plaintiff's three claims

specifically contested USEPA's . application of CERCLA's lien
provision to Reardon 1s property; the third "asserted that
EPA's imposition of the lien without a hearing violated the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution."
The District Court found that CERCLA's limitation of
judicial review, 42 U.S.C. 9613(h), divested it of
jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's statutory claims .
Considering the Constitutional claim, the Court stated that,
while Section 9613(h) purported to deny jurisdiction here,
as well, Congress in fact lacked such power.

However,

finding that the lien under consideration "did not amount to
a taking of a 'significant property interest' protected by
the due process clause," the District Court dismissed the
plaintiff 1s complaint.

%947 F.2d 1509,
(1st c·ir . 1991 ) .

34 Envt.Rep.Cas. 1070,
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22 E.L . R . 20292

Reardon appealed, and the First Circuit, finding that
section 9613(h) permitted the statutory challenges to the
imposition of the lien, reversed the District Court's
decision without reaching the Constitutional question.
USEPA petitioned for rehearing and the First Circuit, en
bane, considered the Constitutional issue.
on rehearing, the appellate court agreed with the
District Court that the filing of the lien was the type of
"enforcement activity" which was protected by the
jurisdictional bar of 42 U.S . C . 9613(h).

Examining the

language and legislative history of CERCLA/SARA, the Court
developed its argument in much the same way as had other
courts which rejected challenges to CERCLA response
activities.
However, the First Circuit's reading of the language of
Section 9613(h) led it to conclude that the section's
jurisdictional bar, in referring to "removal or remedial
actions selected under section 9604, ." applied only to
challenges concerning USEPA's administration of the statute,
not the statute itself.

The Court cited the US Supreme

Court to the effect that "where Congress intends to preclude
judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so
must be clear,

1147

but found no such clear intent within the

language of CERCLA/SARA.

It rejected the reasoning of two

47c.

•
it1ng
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 108 S.Ct . 2047, 100
L.Ed.2d 632 (1988); Weinberger v . Salfi, 422 U.S . 749, 95
S.Ct. 2457, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975); and Johnson v. Robinson,
415 U.S . 361, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 39 L . Ed.2d 389 (1974) .
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earlier cases which had found that 9613(h) did indeed
preclude all Constitutional challenges to CERCLA response
actions, 48 because they did not distinguish between
"challenges to EPA's administration of CERCLA, and
challenges to CERCLA itself."

The Court considered Lone

Pine, supra, as well, but observed that that case did not
rule on the plaintiff's Constitutional claim.
The First Circuit also examined CERCLA/SARA's
legislative history, finding no clear evidence of
congressional intent to bar Constitutional claims against
CERCLA .

It cited a case concerning immigration law, McNary

v. Haitian Refugee Center, 49 in which the Supreme Court
distinguished between administration of a statute and
Constitutional claims against the statute itself with
respect to a similar statutory jurisdictional bar.
Finding that 42 U.S.C. 9613(h) could not preclude
judicial review of Constitutional challenges to CERCLA
itself, the First Circuit went on to. consider Reardon's due
process claim, finding further that CERCLA's lien provisions
had deprived Reardon of a "significant property interest"
without due process of law.

A majority of the First Circuit

panel, therefore, reversed and remanded the constitutional
portion of the suit.

Circuit Judge Cyr authored a

48

Barmet Aluminum v. Reilly, 927 F.2d 289 (6th Cir. 1991)
and South Macomb Disposal Authority v. U.S. E. P.A., 681 F. Supp.
l244 (E.D.Mich. 1988).
~498 U.S . 479, 111 S.Ct. 888, 112 L.Ed.2d 1005
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(1991).

dissenting opinion, disagreeing not with the majority's
conclusion that 42 U.S.C. 9613(h) barred Constitutional
challenges to CERCLA, but that due process had been denied
in this particular instance.

I. D. 2. d.

Case law: Conclusion.

The history of citizen challenges to CERCLA response
actions and the "Timing of Review" provision (42 U.S.C .
g613(h)) demonstrates that the statute has been created as
much by the courts as by Congress.

Faced with ambiguous

statutory language, courts have been forced to consider
every conceivable permutation of the citizen challenge to a
CERCLA cleanup, and to rely heavily upon a legislative
history which is not without internal contradictions.

Eight

years after the passage of the SARA reauthorization, CERCLA
case law remains in flux, particularly in the First Circuit.
The weight of case law at this point clearly favors the
conclusion that pre-completion challenges to USEPA's
administration of CERCLA cleanups are barred by 9613(h).
However, the First Circuit's finding in Reardon, supra,
suggests that a Massachusetts citizens' group which was able
to craft the perfect challenge to CERCLA's constitutionality
might find a yet-unexploited avenue of legal recourse.
Given the number of NPL sites in the Nation and the
controversy which currently attends some of USEPA's
preferred response methods, it seems certain that citizens'
groups will continue thread their way through the tortuous
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case law of CERCLA's citizens-suit provision and
jurisdictional bar, in an effort to influence USEPA response
decisions at CERCLA sites.
This observation has two implications for the study at
hand.

First, that the public participation provisions of

CERCLA are in need of revision.

Congress must clarify the

statute's intent and provide for a medium of
public/governmental communication which is more costeffective than the federal courts.

Second, that if USEPA

can avert legal challenges to its CERCLA response decisions
by involving the public - -as ultimately took place in New
Bedford, by means of ODR's facilitated discussions--the
benefits to public and agency alike might be substantial.

I. D. 3.

Prospective changes in CERCLA 1 s public
participation requirements.

In October, 1994, leaders of Congress and the Clinton
Administration were forced by congressional Republicans to
abandon a major, year-long effort to rewrite the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act.

While the Administration and Democratic

leaders insisted that the legislation would be revived in
1995, just what shape the reauthorization might then take
remains uncertain (Cushman 1995) .
During 1994, committees in both the House and Senate
worked at revisions to CERCLA/SARA which would have
significantly expanded public participation in Superfund.
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use version, titled the Superfund Reform Act of 1994
The Ho
(H. 3 000),

called for increasing the uses to which TAGs

might be put and specified much more comprehensive public
notification and involvement.

It would require public

meetings at every major step of a Superfund cleanup as well
as the formation of state Citizen Information and Access
offices to inform residents of the Superfund sites in their
neighborhoods (US House of Representatives, 1994).

But

perhaps the most fundamental way in which the House bill
would have changed the public participation section of the
superfund statute lay in the bill's explicit requirement
that USEPA seek out and take into account the sentiments of
local residents regarding a Superfund remediation:
SEC. 101. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
(f) (3).
To
solicit and
information
affected by

the extent practicable ... [USEPA] shall
evaluate concerns, interests, and
from the community likely [to be]
the facility ...

(f) (4).
During the remedial investigation and
feasibility study, [USEPA] shall solicit the views
and preferences of the affected community on the
remediation and disposition of hazardous
substances, pollutants, or contaminants at the
facility.
[These] views and preferences ... shall
be ... considered in the screening of remedial
alternatives for the facility.
This bi-directional information flow was emphasized within
the revision's public meeting requirements, as well:
(f} (1) (B)
Public meetings shall be designed to
obtain information from the community and
disseminate information to the community
concerning [USEPA's] facility activities and
pending decisions. (US House of Representatives,
1994) .

48

While the Senate bill, S. 1834, did not elaborate upon
public participation in Superfund to the extent that the
House bill did, its effect would have been substantially the
Like the House version, it would have required USEPA

same.

to employ frequent public meetings and would have
established Citizen Information and Access Offices.

Also

like the House version, and in contrast to current law, S .
l834 would have required USEPA to consider the local

community's views regarding the remediation of a Superfund
site:
TITLE I - COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION AND HUMAN HEALTH
SEC. 101. PURPOSES AND ACTIVITIES
(f)
EARLY, DIRECT AND MEANINGFUL COMMUNITY
INVOLVEMENT . .. [USEPA] shall consider the views,
preferences and recommendations of the affected
community regarding all aspects of the response
activities ...
(h) PROCESS FOR INVOLVEMENT.- As early as
practicable after site discovery, [USEPA] shall
provide regular, direct and meaningful community
involvement in all phases of response activities
at the facility ...
(2) ... The community's views and preferences shall
be ... considered in the development of remedial
alternatives for the facility (US Senate 1994).
Like H. 3800, S. 1834 would have expanded the uses to which
the TAG grants could be put; one such use might be to
"facilitate public participation in the selection of
remedial action at the [Superfund]

facility"

(US Senate

1994) .

The language of both House and Senate versions of the
reauthorization of CERCLA would have required USEPA to
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involve the public to an unprecedented degree in Superfund
decision-making, from the very outset of a project.
clearly, an intent of these changes was to avert the
political consequences of such unpopular Superfund response
decisions as USEPA's 1990 ROD, which called for the
incineration of New Bedford Harbor's contaminated sediments.
The future of this policy shift toward the greater
involvement of local citizens in Superfund decision-making
is now uncertain.
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I. D. 4.

The Greater New Bedford Community Work Group.

Beginning in 1983, USEPA attempted to maintain a degree
of public involvement in decisionmaking at the New Bedford
Harbor Superfund Site by means of public informational
meetings, pamphlets distributed in schools, and several
public comment periods.

In 1987, at the request of USEPA,

the Mayor of New Bedford, John Bullard, appointed the
Greater New Bedford Community Work Group (GNBCWG) to
represent community interests to USEPA.

The Work Group

settled in at about ten active members representing a
variety of community interests- (USEPA 1990) .
In 1989, as USEPA's plan to dredge and incinerate the
Acushnet's most contaminated sediments became public, the
Agency awarded GNBCWG a $50,000 TAG.

The purpose of this

grant was to allow the citizens' group "to conduct an
independent analysis of EPA's site investigation findings
and evalution of cleanup options"

(USEPA 1992a) .

In 1990

the Group voted on USEPA's 'Hot Spot Proposed Plan as part of
the public comment process, voting six to three in favor of
the incineration-dependent preferred alternative (USEPA
1990c) .

In 1991 the original GNBCWG disbanded; it was re-

formed with new members in 1992, and disbanded again in 1993
(Duckworth 1993).

With its 1990 vote, however, it had given

USEPA the trappings of public approval for incineration of
the New Bedford Harbor sediments.

In reality, USEPA's

incineration decision was extremely controversial.
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I.

o.

S.

Conflict over remediation.

While the "official" public group involved in the New
Bedford Harbor Superfund Site, the GNBCWG, was ratifying
USEPA'S decision to incinerate the Hot Spot sediments,
public opposition to the incineration was coalescing on a
variety of levels.

In the early 1990's, three citizens'

groups formed to oppose USEPA's

incineration plans: Hands

Across the River (HATR); the Downwind Coalition (DC); and
concerned Parents of Fair Haven (CPFH) .

These groups

organized demonstrations and lobbied municipal, State, and
Federal representatives to block USEPA's plan, enlisting the
aid of national anti-incineration groups such as Greenpeace
and the Citizens' Clearing House for Hazardous Waste (Starr,
1993) 50 •

Inspired, perhaps, by the recently released United

Church of Christ report (1987) showing a nationwide racial
bias in the location of hazardous waste sites, the groups
charged that USEPA's decision was colored by "environmental
racism" toward the poor, largely ethnic community of the
North End of New Bedford.

Their claim was bolstered by the

fact that a USEPA decision to incinerate PCBs at the
Massachusetts Military Reservation had been recently
defeated by public opposition in the nearby suburban
community of Bourne, Massachusetts (Allen 1992b).

50

The C'it1zen'
'
s
established by the
movement.

Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste was
citizen-organizers of the Love Canal
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opposition to USEPA's incineration plans appears to
have been broad-based and to have been shared by some
members of New Bedford's City Council.

In 1991, the City

council held a non-binding referendum to gauge public
opinion of USEPA's plan, in which two-thirds of participants
voted against incineration.

However, the wording of the

ballot did not explain that the incineration was just one
component of a broad clean-up plan for the harbor, nor that
the installation of the incinerator would be temporary; it
is therefore impossible to determine to what extent citizens
were rejecting USEPA's cleanup.plans, specifically, versus
the general idea of waste incineration in New Bedford (Allen
1992a; Sebastian 1993).
In spite of the apparent groundswell of public
opposition to incineration, USEPA moved toward
implementation of the project in accordance with the 1990
ROD.

By mid-1993, well behind schedule, the Agency's

contractor, Perland Environmental Technologies, began
assembling the wastewater treatment component of the
remediation system.

On July 15, the New Bedford City

Council unanimously passed an ordinance banning the
transportation of "devices or mechanisms of any kind used in
incineration or water treatment through the streets or
airspace of the city without first obtaining a permit from
the mayor and city council"

(New Bedford City Council 1993)

The action catapulted the issue into the front pages of the
New Bedford Standard-Times and prompted USEPA to file suit
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for civil penalties ($25,000 per day, the maximum provided
for by CERCLA) and injunctive relief from the ordinance in
federal District Court, Boston.

On September 29, 1993,

Judge William G. Young enjoined New Bedford from enforcing
its ordinance against USEPA, and enjoined the City from
"obstructing, impeding or otherwise interfering with entry
and access by the Environmental Protection Agency [and] the

u.s. Army Corps of Engineers ... to the Hot Spot Operable Unit
of the New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site"

The Agency

agreed to dismiss its claim for civil penalties when New
Bedford agreed to allow USEPA full access to the site
(United States of America v. City of New Bedford,
Massachusetts, 1993).
The Agency's legal success in enforcing its
incineration decision seems to have been matched by
political failure.

Members of the City Council and of the

activists' groups convinced State and Federal lawmakers to
join them in opposing incineration . . US Senators John Kerry
and Edward Kennedy and US Congressman Barney Frank lobbied
Carol Browner, the newly appointed Administrator of USEPA,
to consider alternative technologies for the cleanup
(Collins 1993; Shaw 1994) .

Frank also lobbied the White

House, involving the General Accounting Office as well as
Leon Panetta, President Clinton's budget director (Glass and
Corey 1993).
The way had been cleared, legally, for USEPA Region I
to continue with its incineration plans.
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However, the

regional office was strongly encouraged behind the scenes,
by the Administrator as well as by Judge Young,

to attempt

to settle the dispute through mediation (Garmon 1994; Shaw
199 4).

The Agency enlisted the help of the Massachusetts

Office of Dispute Resolution, which had recently mediated
negotiations at New Bedford's other Superfund site, the
Sullivan's Ledge landfill (Massachusetts Office of Dispute
Resolution 1993).
The Off ice of Dispute Resolution (ODR) was established
in 1990 by the State General Assembly "to assist agencies
and officers of the executive, . legislative, and judicial
branches of the commonwealth, as well as any city or town to
improve the resolution of disputes that arise within their
respective jurisdictions"

(M . G. L . 1993, Ch. 7, Sec. 51).

The Off ice set about assembling a group of stakeholders and
professionals which would become known as the New Bedford
Harbor Superfund Site Committee.

Committee members were

selected using a consensual, inclusive approach, in an
attempt to represent as many stakeholders as possible.
The three ad-hoc citizens' groups are each represented:
Hands Across the River; Concerned Parents of Fairhaven; and
the Downwind Coalition.

Legal, technical, and managerial

representatives of USEPA sit across the table from the
citizen representatives, as do representatives of the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and
the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection
(DEP) , the Federal and State natural resource trustees for
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the site, respectively.

Elected officials and municipal

representatives include three New Bedford City Councillors;
state senator Mark Montigny and State Representative William
Straus; and representatives of Fair Haven, Acushnet, and the
New Bedford Mayor's Office.

Meetings are public, but

participation is generally limited to committee members.
The discussions are chaired by Michael Keating, a Providence
lawyer and expert on alternative dispute resolution who was
selected by the participants to serve as an impartial
facilitator.

Keating is assisted by one of ODR's

staffmembers (Wells 1994).
Roughly 20 people take part in each meeting; generally,
the same individuals attend each meeting, so a rapport has
developed.

The discussions began with an expression of

interests by each participant.

Since then, the group has

been reviewing alternatives to incineration for the
remediation of the Hot Spot sediments, in hopes of
developing a consensus regarding treatment of the
contaminated sediments of the upper Acushnet River.

The

progress of the discussions led Frank Ciavattieri, head of
USEPA Region I Waste Management Division, to announce on 12
July 1994 that Region I had cancelled its contract with
Perland Environmental Technologies to incinerate the Hot
Spot sediments (Ciavettieri 1994).
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II.

II· A.

The Problem

Difficulty of siting noxious facilities.

Much recent research has suggested that locational
disputes over hazardous facilities result, in part, from
differences in risk perception between the "risk
professionals" who make siting decisions, and the public who
must live in the shadow of such facilities
and Earle, 1992; Slovic, 1987).

(e.g., Cvetkovich

Uncertainty is inherent to

the science of risk assessment (Patton, 1993).

To

complicate matters in New Bedford's case, there is no "zerorisk" option; the choice lies between the risks presumably
inherent in the existing contamination in the waterway,
versus a set of equally uncertain potential risks resulting
from various cleanup options, such as incineration.
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)

is an umbrella

term which encompasses a variety of structured discussion
techniques which have been used increasingly in recent years
to attempt to resolve

environmental disputes in a

consensual, non-litigious manner (Fischer, 1993; Mosher,
1983) .

In the New Bedford case, ADR has taken the form of

"facilitated discussions," coordinated by the Massachusetts
Office of Dispute Resolution (ODR) .
If, as the literature suggests, differences in risk
perception between professionals and the public are a source
of environmental disputes, then one definition of
effectiveness in resolving such disputes would be the
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reduction of such differences.

The problem which this study

examined, therefore, was whether ADR had, in this instance,
reduced differences in risk perception between "risk
managers"--environmental professionals--and "stakeholders"-residents of the towns adjoining the Acushnet River.
In order to measure perceptions of a variety of risk
and trust issues related to the contamination of the
Acushnet River, as well as USEPA's efforts to remediate this
contamination, the study employed a descriptive survey.

The

data so gathered were compared among professionals and nonprofessionals, involved and uninvolved in ODR's facilitated
discussions, in order to discover whether the perceptions of
the two camps within the discussions were closer than those
without.

Such a relationship would demonstrate the

effectiveness of ODR's facilitated discussions.

In

addition, the survey examined public knowledge about the New
Bedford Harbor Superfund Site in order to shed light on the
nature of the conflict, and to identify areas in which the
dissemination of information to the public regarding the
Site might have been improved.
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II· B.

Review of related literature.

II. B. 1.

Risk perception, assessment, and uncertainty.

Human activities give rise to a broad and diverse range
of technological hazards: from minor releases of pollutants
to catastrophic nuclear and chemical plant accidents; from
automobile accidents to the collapse of dams (Cutter 1993).
"Risk" refers to the danger arising from hazards,
incorporating the concept of probability (Lewis 1990)
as Mary Douglas (1990) has written,

Or,

"[r]isk is unequivocally

used to mean danger from future damage."

Given adequate

data, well-defined technological risks of relatively high
probability, such as death by automobile accident, are
easily quantified (though not necessarily without
controversy) .

Low-probability risks, or those which

slightly elevate existing background risks, such as those
attending the contamination of New Bedford Harbor or
incineration of its sediments, are, conversely, extremely
difficult to estimate, even if well-defined (Lewis 1990;
Slovic 1987) .
Quantitative risk assessment is fundamental to
governmental environmental decisionmaking (Patton 1993;
Russell and Gruber, 1987).

In the case of carcinogenic and

toxic chemicals, risk assessment uses extrapolations from
animal data to attempt to estimate the average probability
that a particular consequence will result from a given level
of exposure to a particular substance.
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Probabilities so

obtained are used by USEPA as the foundation for risk
management, the process by which the Agency decides whether
and how a risk should be regulated or mitigated (Patton
1993 ).

While risk assessors work to err on the side of

conservatism, the methodology of risk assessment necessarily
employs a good deal of inference, extrapolation, and
assumption, so that quantitative risk assessment is
inherently uncertain (Patton 1993; Sheuplein 1993; Russell
and Gruber 1987) .
(1992),

According to Freudenburg and Pastor

"[q]uantitative estimates of overall risk are likely

to involve the tyranny of illusory precision."

Moreover,

recent behavioral research has shown that expert risk
assessments are built largely upon subjective judgements
(Gardner and Gould, 1989).

If one accepts these points of

view, then, the truly objective risk quantification becomes
an impossibility.
To the extent that federal decisionmaking sees risk as
something which can be accurately quantified, it takes a
technical, or objectivist, view of risk.

In contrast to

this model is one proposed by researchers in the behavioral
sciences, which might be referred to as the constructionist,
or subjective, view.

According to this view, risks and

hazards are broad social phenomena, functions of collective
actions and judgements with respect to the physical world.
Within this paradigm, perception becomes more important than
efforts at quantification (Cutter, 1993; Cvetkovich and
Earle, 1992), while "risk" refers not just to chance of
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death or loss of "statistical lives," but incorporates an
array of undesirable effects (Gardner and Gould, 1989) .
The study of risk perception originally concerned
itself with natural hazards, but has since evolved to deal
largely with technical ones.

The work may be divided into

two broad categories: that which utilizes a primarily
psychological approach, and that which is essentially
spatial.

The former is characterized by emphasis on

cognitive aspects of risk perception (often utilizing
controlled experiments) while the latter is more
functionally oriented, generally site-specific, and often
concerned with the relationship between behavior and
political or physical action (Cutter 1993).
Starr (1969) was among the first to attempt to quantify
public perception of technological risks, employing a
"revealed preference" methodology to draw conclusions about
the risks and benefits of technologies based upon historical
data (Slavic 1987) .

This approach was superceded by what

Slovic refers to as the · "psychometric paradigm:" the use of
"expressed preferences" or survey methodology to show that
different groups perceive given risks in quantifiably
different ways, and that, conversely, different risks can be
distinguished by quantifiable characteristics using factor
analysis (Slovic 1987) .
In the groundbreaking Risk and Culture (1982), however,
Douglas and Wildavsky offer a far more subjective view of
risks and risk perception.

Drawing on anthropology as well
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as political theory, these authors argue that risks are
"cultural constructs." That is, while risks are often real
(though frequently hidden) , their perception and selection
are functions of particular cultural biases.
By 1990, Wildavsky and Dake could describe three major
theories of risk perception prevalent in the social
sciences.

"Knowledge theory" posits the idea that people

perceive risks because they actually know things to be
dangerous.

"Personality theory," conversely, proposes that

risk perception is a function of one's personality, while
"economic theory" sees a personal cost-benefit calculus
driving risk perception.

These researchers conclude that

personality variables tend to be the best predictor of
attitudes toward environmental risks.

Similarly, Samdahl

and Robertson (1989) examined the existing body of work as
well as their own questionnaire, concluding that while
socioeconomic variables are generally poor predictors of
environmental concern, political ideology corresponded
strongly with pro-environmental values.
Other researchers have examined the psychological
context of complex environmental decisionmaking, including
that concerned with technological risk.

A number of

researchers have shown that, faced with a great deal of
complicated information, individuals--experts included-employ "cognitive oversimplification" or heuristic methods
to arrive at a decision (Miller 1985, Varis 1989).

Miller

(l985) shows that such simplification inevitably results in
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decisionmaking bias, distinguishing between "cognitive
bias"--that which results from the simple inability to
incorporate all relevant factors into a decision--and
"motivational bias"--that which is driven by ulterior
motives.
In contrast to these psychological approaches to the
study of risk perception, geographers have taken a more
functional or contextually-oriented approach, examining the
factors influencing individual or group response to actual
situations (Cutter, 1993).

Furuseth (1990), for example,

has explored spatial aspects of citizen response to the
siting of a sanitary landfill in North Carolina, one of a
number of investigations into the dimensions of the NIMBY
(Not In My Backyard) phenomenom.

This study found that,

while a spatial dimension to citizens' objections to the
siting did exist, it was by no means the only important
predictor of response.

Hatfield (1989) compared groups

involved in the siting of a hazardous waste incinerator in
Southern California, using factor analysis to examine how
attitudes toward specific siting variables differed among
groups.

Interestingly, he found survey respondents who

attended public meetings on the issue to be significantly
more risk-averse than respondents contacted by mail.
Several researchers have used survey-based risk
perception studies to attempt to weigh perceived costs and
benefits of technologies.

Cutter (1984) used a series of

questionnaires to examine public assessment of risks and
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benefits of the Three Mile Island nuclear plant, while
Gardner and Gould (1989) compared residents of Arizona and
Connecticut with respect to perceived risks, benefits, and
acceptability of several technologies.

II. B. 2. The nature of locational disputes: Differences in
perception; NIMBY and LULU.

Much recent work has shown that differences in risk
perception between professionals and laypeople are a primary
source of conflicts over environmental technology (e.g. Fort
et al. 1993; Cvetkovich and Earle 1992; Gardner and Gould
1989; Slovic 1987; Miller 1984).

Miller (1984) has shown

that this disparity results, in part, from inherent biases
held by experts and laypeople, including biases resulting
from media coverage and attitudes of distrust toward certain
categories of individuals, such as representatives of
government.

Moreover, the two groups may define "risk" in

this context in entirely different ways (Slovic, 1987).
Professional environmental managers tend to define risk in
terms of probability of death or injury while laypeople
employ a broader calculus, taking into account more
qualitative factors.

These include the existence of

disagreement among experts; the degree of equity with which
risks are borne (Gardner and Gould 1989); effects upon
property values (Cvetkovich and Earle 1992); and the degree
of public control over the selection of risks (Fiorino
1989).
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Two acronyms have come to describe local public
resistance to the siting of technological facilities:

1

NIMBY

(Not rn My Back Yard) and LULU (Locally Unwanted Land Use)
The two terms regard the same phenomenom from slightly
different perspectives.

Those who use NIMBY "tend to see

only the location, not the technology, as problematic,"
while users of the term LULU implicitly acknowledge that
certain types of facilities are likely to meet with public
opposition regardless of their proposed location
(Freudenburg and Pastor 1992).

Hazardous waste treatment

facilities are among the least . wanted (Popper 1981).

Popper

has argued that LULUs are an unavoidable fact of land-use
planning, but that a variety of tactics exist to increase
community acceptance, such as on-site mitigation and goodfaith public involvement.

Numerous studies have explored

the idea of monetary compensation to communities in return
for siting a LULU (e.g. Portney 1985; Fort et al. 1993).
Other investigations have shown that . social distrust--lack
of public confidence in government and/or industry--is often
an important part of the conflict surrounding these LULUs
(e.g. Cvetkovich and Earle 1992; Kasperson et al. 1992;
Freudenburg and Pastor 1992).

Freudenburg and Pastor argue

that, to move toward the minimization of LULU controversies,
research is needed which crosses the boundary between
professionals and the public.

They call for "more research

I

~swell as other types of controversial facilities, such
as prisons, homeless shelters, and sex-related businesses.
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which is genuinely comparative -- treating as problematic
not just the views of the general public, but of both the
public and the technical community (1992) .

II. B. 3.

Public participation in environmental
decisionmaking.

A subtext of much recent risk perception literature-particularly that written from the social science
perspective--is the desirability of increasing local public
involvement in environmental decisionmaking.

Goals of

increased participation include enhancing the acceptability
of LULUs as well as the furthering of democratic ideals
(Kasperson et al. 1992; Fiorino 1989; Kasperson 1986;
Portney 1985) .

Arnstein (1969) pointed out that there is a

hierarchy of citizen involvement in government
decisionmaking, ranging from the nominal ("tokenism") to the
actual ("citizen power").

An objective of some risk

perception studies has been to forge . a theoretical link
between perception and participation, i.e., to explain
citizen action (Cutter 1993).

II. B. 4.

Alternative dispute resolution.

Clearly, a priori public involvement is more efficient
than a protracted environmental dispute (which is not to
suggest that either is inevitable, nor that the two are
mutually exclusive).

Once a dispute does occur, it may be

resolved either by legal proceedings or by alternative
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dispute resolution (ADR) .

Cormick (1980) has argued that

ADR requires and promotes the more developed model of
citizen participation, that which empowers the public.
While a number of authors have advocated the use of ADR for
the resolution of environmental disputes (e.g. Fischer 1993;
Mosher 1983), there have been relatively few attempts to
critically assess the effectiveness of ADR (Nakamura et al.
l991; Wells 1994).

Nakamura et al. examined a failed effort

at ADR concerning a Superfund Site in upstate New York,
concluding that ADR must be properly managed in order to
carry a high probability of success.

II. B. S.

Justice, equity, and public involvement under
Superfund.

A recent, yet growing, body of literature is concerned
with "environmental equity:" the social justice aspect of
environmental decisionmaking.

A landmark study on this

topic was that commissioned by the United Church of Christ
(1987), which examined the relationship between ethnic and
racial variables and the locations of hazardous waste sites
and commercial hazardous waste treatment facilities
nationwide.

Controlling for socioeconomic variables, the

study found high correlations between race and ethnicity and
proximity to hazardous waste sites.

Research by Hird (1993)

agreed that Superfund sites are more likely to occur in
communities with more non-white residents, but found a
positive correlation between wealthier communities and the
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frequency of hazardous waste sites.

Hird's research found

great variability in the cost-effectiveness of Superfund,
concluding that costs per statistical life saved ranged from
$ 34 0,000 to $77 billion.

The limit of cost-effectiveness

for environmental clean-ups is generally considered to be
$l0 million per statistical life saved (Hird, 1993).
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II·

c.

Significance of the study.

The outcome of this research has significance for the
pending reauthorization of Superfund's enabling legislation,
the comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) as amended by the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) . 2
Arguably, CERCLA's weak requirements for public involvement
in superfund decisionmaking are partly to blame for the
magnitude of the current dispute.

In an attempt to

reconcile the opposing sides, the facilitated discussions
chaired by the Massachusetts Off ice of Dispute Resolution
(ODR) have involved the public to a much greater degree than
required by CERCLA.

If the discussions have indeed

accomplished their purpose, a strong case could be made for
expanding CERCLA's public involvement requirements when the
law is reauthorized.

Moreover, the revision might be worded

so as to encourage the type of consensual process typified
by ODR's facilitated discussions,

rather than litigation, to

resolve the public/governmental conflicts which inevitably
arise under Superfund.

A relevant question for CERCLA,

therefore, is: have ODR's facilitated discussions been
working?

That is, have they caused the hazard perceptions

of citizens and managers, regarding the New Bedford Harbor
Superfund Site and its remediation, to converge?

2

42 U.S.C. Section 9601 et seq.
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III.

III. A.

The method.

Hypotheses.

1·
III· A •

General Hypothesis.

In general, the research hypothesized that a particular
facilitated discussion had enhanced the potential for the
resolution of a local/Federal conflict regarding a coastal
superfund Site.

Specifically, it was hypothesized that

participation in ODR's facilitated discussions had reduced
the differences in risk perception between the disputants in
the case of the New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site.

These

disputants were characterized as follows:
1.

Those who opposed incineration: local citizens and
their representatives--the three ad hoc environmental
groups as well as local politicians .

2.

Those who favored incineration: Federal and State
coastal resource managers--specifically,
representatives of USEPA and DEP .

III. A. 2.

Study groups·.

In order to test the general hypothesis at a discrete
point in time, the two disputant groups were subdivided so
that differences in risk perception between citizens and
managers within ODR's discussions might be compared with
differences in risk perception between citizens and managers
uninvolved in the discussions.

In other words, the

following four sub-groups of stakeholders were regarded for
analysis:
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Gro

up 1:
Citizens' representatives who participated in the
facilitated discussions chaired by ODR.

Group 2:
Citizens of the Greater New Bedford Metropolitan
Area who had not participated in these facilitated
discussions, represented by a random sample.
Group 3:
Coastal resource managers included in the
facilitated discussions chaired by ODR.
Group 4:
Coastal resource managers who were uninvolved in
these facilitated discussions, represented by a nonrandom sample .

III. A. 3.

Assumptions.

In order to establish the context of the hypothesis,
the research employed the following assumptions:
Assumption 1:
It is assumed that the current perceptions of
Group 2, regarding hazards associated with the New
Bedford Harbor Superfund Site and its remediation, are
statistically similar to the perceptions of Group 1 at
the point at which these citizen representatives became
involved in ODR's facilitated discussions.
Assumption 2:
It is assumed that the current perceptions of
Group 4, regarding hazards associated with the New
Bedford Harbor Superfund Site and its remediation, are
statistically similar to the perceptions of Group 3 at
the point at which these coastal resource managers
became involved in ODR's facilitated discussions.
III. A. 4.

Major Hypothesis.

It was hypothesized that the involvement of individuals
in the series of facilitated discussions chaired by ODR
reduced the differences in hazards perception between the
two opposing sides in the dispute over the remediation of
the the New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site.
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III· A.

s.

Hypothetical model.

The study's major hypothesis may be represented
graphically by positioning the perceptions of the four study
groups along a continuum, as follows.

Point. of
Theoretical
Agreement

Citizens

Managers

I------------I------------I-----------I--------------I
Group 2
Group 1
Group 3
Group 4

Initial
citizens'
perceptions

Managers'
perceptions
after facil'd
discussion

Citizens'
perceptions
after facil'd
discussion

Initial
managers'
perceptions

<<------------------

----------------->>

Effect of facilitated
discussions on profess'!
perception

Effect of facilitated
discussions on public
perception

This model incorporates, implicitly, two hypothetical ideas:
1) The difference in perception between Groups 1 and 3
is smaller than the difference in direction between
Groups 2 and 4.
2)
The two public groups (Groups 1 and 2) lie at one
end of the continuum, while the professional groups (3
and 4) lie at the other.
In other words, while the facilitated discussion has brought
the two sides closer together, it has not changed the
direction of individuals' perceptions to any significant
degree.

That is, few if any individuals have switched sides

in the debate as a result of participation in the
facilitated discussions.
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III· A. 6.

Research hypotheses.

The two-tailed null and research hypotheses may be
expressed as follows:
~=

~:

It is hypothesized that there are no statistically
significant differences in the measured perceptions of
the four groups, regarding the hazards associated with
the New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site.
It is hypothesized that there are statistically
significant differences in the measured perceptions of
the four groups, regarding the hazards associated with
the New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site.

The research hypothesis is in turn subdivided into three
one-tailed sub-hypotheses, as follows:
sub-hypothesis 1:
It is hypothesized that the difference in
perception between Group 1 and Group 3, regarding the
hazards associated with the New Bedford Harbor
Superfund Site and its remediation, is, to a
statistically significant degree, less than the
difference in perceptions between Group 2 and Group 4.
Sub-hypothesis 2:
It is hypothesized that the difference in
perception between Group 1 and Group 2, regarding the
hazards associated with the New Bedford Harbor
Superfund Site and its remediation, is, to a
statistically significant degree, less than the
difference in perceptions between Group 1 and Group 4.
Sub-hypothesis 3:
It is hypothesized ·that the difference in
perception between Group 3 and Group 4, regarding the
hazards associated with the New Bedford Harbor
Superfund Site and its remediation, is, to a
statistically significant degree, less than the
differences in perception between Group 3 and Group 2.

The three sub-hypotheses may be graphically represented in
relation to the main hypothesis as follows:
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I------------I------------I-----------I--------------I
Group 2

Group 1

sub-hypothesis 1:

( IGl - G3 I )

<---------------<--sub-hypothesis 2:

<- IG1-G2

<

<-----------

( I Gl - G2 I )

Gl - G2

(I G3-G4 I)
I

( I G2

- G4

<

( I Gl - G4

I
<

l)

I)

Gl - G4

(I G3

I

------------->

- G2)

----------><-

G3 - G4

Group 4

-------------------->
----->

G2 - G4
Gl - G3

I -><----------

Sub-hypothesis 3:

Where

Group 3

IG3

- G21

->

the difference in perception
between Group 1 and Group 2, etc.

In practice, statistical testing of survey results needed to
be undertaken only where the general order of the expected
relationship was initially apparent, based on margin totals
of the results.

In other words, a simple examination of the

margin totals (mean by group for Likert-scale questions;
percent frequency by group for frequency-based questions)
showed whether the position of each group along the
perceptual continuum was the same as that of the
hypothetical model, for a given survey question .

Where the

expected relationship was not so apparent, Hr could be
rejected without statistical testing.

Where the general

order of the hypothetical model was apparent, statistical
testing for differences among groups was undertaken, in
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order to determine whether the differences among groups were
statistically significant .
statistical results which supported the existence of
the hypothesized model would suggest that the process of
dispute resoloution had, in this particular case, moved
opposing sides toward compromise.

If, however, statistical

testing resulted in the acceptance of the null hypothesis,
concerns would be raised regarding the possible failure of
the process of dispute resolution.

Faced with such an

outcome, the study would be forced to ask, what do the
survey data tell us about the nature of the dispute and its
reconciliation, in the context of public perception of the

New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site?
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III· B.

Study area and sample population.

The delineation of a study area for a project such as
this was necessarily somewhat arbitrary, since

decisionmaking affecting the New Bedford Superfund Site
occurs as far away as Boston and Washington and as near as
the nearest resident--a mere stone's throw from the Hot
spot.
In the case of Groups 1 and 3--participants in ODR's
facilitated discussions--there was no choice in the matter
if the sample were to be comprehensive.

In fact, most of

the citizen representatives (Group 1) reside in the same
three-town area as the public random sample (Group 2);
several live in the surrounding towns: Dartmouth,
Mattapoisett, or Marion, Massachusetts.

Most of the

professional participants (Group 3) work in Boston.
In the case of Group 4--professionals uninvolved in
ODR's discussions--the study attempted to define the sample
which was a) most nearly comparable to Group 3, and b) most
likely to be generally familiar with the New Bedford Harbor
site: marine resource professionals working in the
Southeastern Massachusetts region.
Group 2--the public random sample--was by far the
largest of the four study groups.

The three Massachusetts

towns of New Bedford, Fair Haven, and Acushnet were chosen
as the study area for this group because they adjoin the
Acushnet River; thus all are directly affected by the
contamination of the river and by the Superfund cleanup.
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Moreover, they were the three towns best represented on the
facilitated discussions, and the only towns formally
represented thereon.
2

The choice of this area allowed Group

to be as nearly comparable, geographically, to Group 1 as

possible.

Sample size for Group 2 was determined on a

strictly pragmatic basis--it was as large as was feasible
with the resources available at the time.
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III·

c.

survey design.

Two forty-question survey instruments were used in the
study: one for the two public groups (Groups 1 and 2) and
one for the two professional groups (3 and 4).

The two

versions had different sets of introductory questions but
shared thirty-three "core questions."
differed slightly among the groups.

Cover letters
Appendix B includes

complete survey texts: introductory questions, core
questions, and sample cover letters.
The most important step in designing the survey
instrument was to determine the defining issues in the
dispute between citizens and managers regarding the New
Bedford Harbor Superfund Site.

The primary source for this

investigation was a videotape of the second of ODR's
facilitated discussions, held on January 5, 1994, at the
Greater New Bedford Vocational High School.

At this

meeting, each participant was asked by the facilitator to
put forth their interests regarding the Superfund site.
They were asked not to make position statements, but rather
to state concerns with the course of the remediation process
(City of New Bedford 1994) .
The discussion participants cited a fairly broad range
of concerns.

At this time the most intense point of

disagreement concerned the health risks associated with
incineration of the Hot Spot sediments.

Other areas of

dispute included severity of ambient site risks; importance
of expediting the clean-up; the validity of USEPA's past
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public participation efforts; and the existence of bias in
government decisionmaking.

Summarized and organized, the

discussion yielded fourteen major points of disagreement,
which could be grouped under seven general headings.

The

results of this procedure are detailed in Appendix A.
once identified, these issues became the basis for the
study's questionnaire.

The thirty-three "core questions"

were designed to measure four broad categories of perception
relevant to the New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site: perceived
risk of the existing contamination; perceived risk of
USEPA's remediation plans; trust in the Government's ability
to deal with the site; and the effectiveness of Government's
communication about the site.

As mentioned, the core

questions were included the surveys administered to all four
groups.

Questions utilized Likert scales, rank-order

questions, and forced-choice formats.
In addition, two sets of seven introductory questions
were created: one for the public survey administered to
Groups 1 and 2; the other for the professional survey given
to Groups 3 and 4.

Introductory questions in the public

survey sought to discern basic demographic variables, degree
and sources of knowledge about the Site, and personal
attitudes toward risk.

Those in the professional version

were intended to determine the managers' role in site
management and general attitudes toward citizen involvement,
as well as, again, personal attitudes toward risk.
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A prototype of the public survey was pre-tested in New
Bedford and Fairhaven on June 28 and 29, 1994.

I knocked on

the doors of six houses, chosen arbitrarily, introduced
myself, and asked the residents to complete the survey.

In

half the cases I was able to sit and talk with the
respondent while he or she filled out the survey; in all
cases, I discussed it with them afterward.
It was immediately apparent that there was a great deal
of interest in the New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site among
local people; it seemed, therefore, that residents did not
regard the ten-page survey to be as onerous as they
otherwise might have.

Generally, the pretest respondents

seemed to find that the survey required some thought, but
was not difficult, although they found some questions to be
in need of clarification.

These were revised in the

subsequent, and final, version.
An interesting, but unexpected, influence upon survey
results came to light during these pretest discussions.
During the spring and summer of 1994, the New England
Fisheries Management Council and the National Marine
Fisheries Service were implementing Amendment 5 of the
Northeast Multispecies Management Plan--the "Groundfish
Plan"--as well as Amendment 4, the "Scallop Plan."

The

provisions of these plans amounted to the most severe
regulation ever placed upon New England fisheries,

including

strict limits on catch quantities and vessel-days-at-sea, as
Well as stringent gear regulation.
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Many New England

fishermen were outraged.

New Bedford fishermen brought

their boats to Boston to protest the plans in February and
March of 1994; many expressed a belief that the Government
was trying to put them out of business (Pollack 1994a and
1994b) .
During the pretest, respondents with personal ties to
the commercial fishing industry expressed great antipathy
toward the Federal Government, which they perceived as
foisting draconian regulations upon them.

This sentiment

clearly influenced attitudes toward Government decisionmaking regarding the New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site.

As

a result of this discovery, the revised version of the
survey included a question to establish how closely a
respondent was connected with the scallop and groundfish
industries, if at all.
The public version of the survey was translated into
Portuguese and Spanish by native speakers.

By preparing

surveys in these languages, in addition to English, the
study ensured that the survey instrument would be
intelligible to at least 93.3% of residents over five years
of age within the study area (US Department of Commerce,
1992b).

During distribution of the surveys, those Spanish

speakers encountered turned out to be equally comfortable
with English or Portuguese; therefore, no Spanish surveys
were administered.
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III· D.

Survey administration.

III. D. 1.
Groups
ODR's

Discussion participants: Groups 1 and 3.
1

and 3--citizens and professionals involved in

facilitated discussions--were queried

comprehensively.

The Office of Dispute Resolution provided

a list of forum participants and affiliations; based on
group affiliations, participants were divided into citizen
representatives versus professionals for study purposes.
Facilitators were excluded from the study group, while
elected officials were placed in Group 1.
The discussion facilitators introduced me at one of the
last of the forum's regular meetings, in July, 1994.

I

contacted each of the discussion participants soon
thereafter, briefly describing the nature of the study, and
asking them to complete a survey, with an assurance of
confidentiality.

I emphasized that I was looking for

individual perceptions rather than official position
statements.

In all

cas~s,

the forum participants agreed to

at least look at the survey, although some of the
professionals expressed a concern that their responses would
be kept truly confidential (one went so far as to say "I
could lose my job over this"), while others communicated an
initial unwillingness to separate their own ideas from that
of their employer.

Subjects were then mailed surveys

(public or professional, as appropriate) along with a
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Survey

personalized cover letter and return envelope.

response rates for Groups 1 and 3 were as follows:
Table 3.1:
Survey distribution and response: forum
participants, Groups 1 and 3.

Group

Number of
individuals

Number who
agreed to
be surveyed

Number of
surveys
returned

Response
rate

Group 1

13

12

8

66.7%

Group 3

11

11

9

81.8%

The list of participants in the facilitated discussions when
the surveys were administrated may be found in Appendix C.

III. D. 2.

Professional non-participants: Group 4.

The study's Group 4 (marine resource managers
uninvolved in ODR's facilitated discussions) was chosen in a
non-random, non-comprehensive manner.

Admittedly, this is a

weak selection method in terms of· validity; however, it was
the only practical way to assemble an adequate number of
individuals with the required characteristics.

Subjects for

this segment of the study were choseri from my own
acquaintances in the field of environmental management and
these professionals' referrals.

Criteria for selection were

as follows:
1.
That the individual was involved in any aspect
of environmental or coastal management on a
professional level.

2. That s/he was working in Massachusetts, and
professed at least a general knowledge of the New
Bedford Harbor Superfund Site.
3. That s/he had at no time been an active
participant in ODR's facilitated discussions .
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In order to ensure that Group 4 was approximately the same
size as Groups 1 and 3, nine individuals were contacted.
Methodology from this point was essentially the same as for
Groups 1 and 3: after outlining the purpose of the study, I
asked whether they would be willing to participate.
cases, they initially agreed.

In most

A copy of the professional

version of the survey was then mailed to each, along with a
personalized cover letter and return envelope.

After

reading the survey, one member of Group 4 declined to
participate: an employee of NOAA, who simply said that he
did not feel that his completion of the survey would be
"appropriate."

Distribution and returns were as follows:

Table 3.2: Survey distribution and response: professionals
uninvolved in forum, Group 4.

Group
4

III. D. 3.

# queried

# agreed/
distributed

9

8

Response
rate

# returned
7

87.5%

Public random sample: Group 2.

In order to query the non-aligned New Bedford area
public (Group 2)

I

the public version of the survey was

administered to a stratified random sample of residents of
New Bedford, Fair Haven, and Acushnet from 6
1994.

-

27

July,

Using the approach described by West (1993), ten

random traverses were laid across a map of the study area
(Champion Map Corporation, 1990) .

City blocks were selected

at random intervals along these lines; rural areas were
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excluded.

The distribution and return of surveys to , and

from, Group 2 is fully described by Table 3 . 3.
Table 3.3: Distribution and return of surveys by town: Group
2
r-

.

Town

Pop.

%
tot.
pop.

# of
blcks
sam'd

# of
surv
/blk

tot.
#
dist

%
tot.
dist

#
ret'd

%
tot.
ret'd

N.B.

99,
922

79.5

19

7

133

78.6

84

63 . 2%

Ac sh

9554

7.6

2

7

14

8.3

7

50%

F.H.

16,
132

12.8

11

2

22

13.0

19

86.4%

TOT.

125,
608

99.9

33

169

99.9

110

65.1%

I administered the Group -2 surveys personally, going
door to door, weekdays during evening hours; my method was
adapted from that used by Fenton and Syme (1989) for a study
of Australians' perceptions of the coastal zone.

Beginning

at the northeast corner of each selected block , I moved
clockwise about the interior of the block, knocking on each
door.

If the necessary number of surveys could not be

distributed within the interior of the block, I then moved
about the exterior; if the quota still had not been reached,
I moved one block northward to repeat the process.

Where

the Selected block was non-residential, I moved one block to
the North, as many times as necessary to obtain a primarily
residential block.

In cases of mixed-use blocks, commercial

establishments were omitted from the survey.

Multi-story,

multi-family dwellings--the tenements which comprise most of
the housing within the study area--were approached at street
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level only, for practical reasons, although upper-story
residents were often present in the ground-floor apartments,
in which case they were asked to participate.
once someone answered a door,

I introduced myself and

asked whether an adult resident of that home was willing to
complete a survey regarding "the contamination problem in
the Acushnet River."

In nearly all instances, residents

were at least aware that such a condition existed.

Of 211

residents with whom I spoke, 169 (80%) agreed to complete
the ten-page survey, confirming my initial impression of
If a resident wanted to

great local interest in this issue.

discuss the Superfund Site with me, I would ask them to
first complete the survey.

Only one survey per household

was distributed; residents were asked to be sure that only
adults completed the survey.

The survey, along with a self-

addressed stamped envelope, was left with residents who
agreed to participate.

As shown in Table 3.3, the overall

response rate was approximately 65% . .
If the resident expressed an unwillingness to
participate, I would gently try to persuade them; if they
were at all adamant,

I did not persist.

In perhaps half of

the cases where a resident initially refused participation,
I was able to convince them to complete a survey.
Unfortunately, in a few cases where passions ran highest, I
was unable to elicit cooperation.

One elderly gentleman

said: "I was a foreman at Cornell, and I know too much about
what went on there to answer your survey!"
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Another said,

"I

worked at Aerovox for thirty-five years; they took
bloodtests for that health study and found nothing wrong
with me.

I ' ve done my part."

Try though I might,

I could

convince neither to participate; this was a loss to the
study, since the capacitor manufacturers for whom both men
worked are considered to be the among the principal sources
of the PCB contamination of New Bedford Harbor.
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IV.

IV· A.

Analysis

Description of sample by group.

As explained in Chapter III, the study's survey was
distributed to four groups:
Group 1:
Citizens' representatives who had participated
in the facilitated discussions chaired by the
Massachusetts Off ice of Dispute Resolution (ODR) .
citizen-participants were queried comprehensively.
Group 2:
Citizens of the Greater New Bedford Metropolitan
Area who had not participated in these facilitated
discussions, selected by means of a stratified random
sample of New Bedford, Fair Haven and Acushnet
residents.
Group 3: Coastal resource managers who had been involved in
the facilitated discussions. Manager-participants
were, like Group 1, queried comprehensively.
Group 4:
Coastal resource managers who had not been
involved in these facilitated discussions, represented
by a non-random sample.

Distribution and return of surveys by group are summarized
in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Distribution and return of surveys by group.

Tot. # Dist'd.

Response Rate

N for analysis

Group 1

12

66.7%

8

Group 2

169

65.1%

110

Group 3

11

81.8%

9

Group 4

8

87.5%

7

200

67.0%

134

TOTAL

Responses to the initial, descriptive section of the survey
(Questions 1-7, which differed for citizens and
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professionals), may be used to infer some general
characteristics of each study group:

Group 1:

All respondents in Group 1 were long-term

residents of the New Bedford area (minimum area residency 24
years) .

Of the 75% of this group who chose to describe

their employment, all reported white-collar employment;
none, however, had worked for any of the potentially
responsible parties (PRPs: the capacitor manufacturers
responsible for contamination of the harbor) .

All reported

having known of the pollution problem for at least three
years.

The responses of this group do not suggest a single

most important source of information "concerning local
events and controversies"

(Question 7, public survey);

however, television (including local-access cable),
newspaper, conversation and town meetings are each seen as
important by at least three-quarters of Group 1.

This

suggests a group of individuals who are well-informed,
obtaining information through a variety of sources.

Group 2:

Group 2 reported residency in the New Bedford area

ranging from one-half year to 84 years, with a mean
residency of approximately 38 years.

Slightly more than 76%

of this Group reported having known of the harbor
contamination for three years or more .

Of those who chose

to report employment status, 36% were not employed, 61% were
employed by non-PRPs, and only 2.7% (2) reported employment
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Those who further described their employment were

by PRPS.

about evenly divided between blue and white-collar workers.
Again, no single source of information "concerning local
events and controversies" seemed most important: radio,
television, and newspapers were all rated highly by this
group.

Predictably, in comparison with Group 1, far fewer

Group 2 respondents considered public meetings to be an
important source of information: 14.3% as opposed to 87.5%
among Group 1.

Group 3:

Not a single Group 3 . respondent was a resident of

the New Bedford area.

Reported period of involvement in

environmental management ranged from 2 to 26 years, with a
mean of approximately 13.4 years.

When these individuals

were asked how often they interacted with non-professionals
during the course of their work, responses showed no
clustering, ranging from "at least once a day" to a minimum
of "once a month" or "varies too much to say."

Asked to

describe their role in site management, over half of these
professionals (62.5%) considered their primary role a
managerial one; l~ss than a third (28.5%) rated the
technical component of their work most important.

None of

the Group 3 managers considered "public information" to be
the most important aspect of their work.

Asked by means of

a Likert scale whether public involvement in governmental
environmental decisionmaking was, generally,
hindrance"

"a help or a

(Question 6, professional survey), Group 3
90

exp re

ssed cautious faith in citizen participation, favoring

public involvement (mean response 7.33).

Asked whether

public involvement should be expanded within CERCLA's
reauthorization {Question 7, professional survey), these
managers were, again, cautiously positive (mean response
7 .44).

Group 4:

Only one of the seven Group 4 managers queried

(approximately 14%) had resided in the study area.

Period

of involvement in environmental management showed a range
similar to that of Group 3 (5 to 33 years) and a similar
mean (12.0 years).

In contrast to the professionals of

Group 3, almost half (42.9%) of the Group 4 professionals
reported being in contact with the public "at least once a
day."

Also unlike Group 3, over half the Group 4

professionals rated the technical component of their work
most important (57.1%); only one of the seven considered
their managerial function most important (14.3%), while one
other (14.3%) considered his or her public information
capacity most important .

Regarding the efficacy of public

involvement in environmental decisionmaking (Question 6,
professional survey), Group 4 agreed, essentially, with
Group 3 (mean response 7 . 71); they were slightly less keen
than Group 3, however, on the desirability of expanding
public involvement in Superfund (mean response 6.83).
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IV· B.

IV·

B

Analytical approach.

1

General methodology.

· ·
Results of each of the survey's thirty-three "core

questions"

{Questions 8-40, those which were administered to

all four study groups) were examined in order to ascertain
whether the hypothesized relationship was present.

The

reader will remember that the study's hypothetical model was
one where:
1.

The difference in perception between those groups
which had participated in the facilitated
discussions (Groups 1 and 3) was smaller than the
difference between those which had not (Groups 2
and 4), but

2.

Direction of differences separating citizens from
managers remained constant; that is, the
perceptions of the citizens (Groups 1 and 2)
occupied one end of a continuum, while those of
the managers (Groups 3 and 4) occupied the other.

This hypothetical relationship is diagrammed, once again,
below.
Point of
· Theoretical
Agreement

Citizens

Managers

I------------I------------I-----------I--------------I
Group 2

Group 1

Group 3

Group 4

The results of each of the survey's 33 "core questions" were
tested for the existence of this hypothetical relationship
in two steps:
1.

Tabulation of means and frequencies, using the SAS
statistical package, and examination of these
totals to determine whether the general
relationship diagrammed above was apparent.
92

2.

Where the expected relationship was generally
evident, statistical testing was undertaken in
order to determine whether differences among
groups were statistically significant.

In other words, if the graphic relationship expressed in the
study's hypothetical model was initially discernable, and
there were significant differences among the study groups,
then the research hypothesis was accepted, and the null
rejected.

Where the graphic relationship of the

hypothetical model was not evident, then, the null
hypothesis could be accepted, and the research hypothesis
rejected; questions which fell into this category were not
initially examined for statistical significance.

IV. B. 2.

Statistical approach: Likert-scale questions.

In keeping with the methodology explained above, the
first step involved a simple examination of the means of the
Likert score by group for each question .

Where the

hypothetical relationship was initially apparent, the
Student-t test was used to test for significant differences
among group means.
Since Group 2's mean dominated the study's universal
mean by virtue of Group 2's proportionally large n
while N

=

(n2 = 110

134), the three smaller groups were tested for

divergence from the universal mean, µ.

Strictly speaking,

the existence of statistically significant differences
between each of the smaller groups and µ would not imply
d i' f ferences among the smaller groups (e . g., between 3 and
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4) .

However, in the context of the limitations imposed by

the differences in size among the study groups, the
relationship between µ and the three smaller groups (Groups
1

, 3 , and 4) was taken to be an indicator that the

hypothetical relationship was present in some form.
conversely, the lack of such significant differences allowed
the research hypothesis to be rejected, and the null
accepted.
The formula for the Student t Test is as follows:

xme-µ
std/Jn-l

t=-----

Where:
student t statistic.
Mean for sample group (Group 1, 3, or 4) .
Xme
Mean
for all groups, combined.
µ
Standard deviation of sample group.
std
n = Size of sample group.
df = degrees of freedom = n - 1
(West 1993)
t

Blalock's (1979) table for the distribution of t in a two tailed test was used to determine whether or not differences
among groups were statistically significant at the 95th
percentile, i.e. a s .OS.

IV. B. 3.

Statistical approach: Frequency-based responses.

The first step of hypothesis testing of the survey's
checklist and rank-order responses, like that for the
Likert-scale questions, involved simply examining the margin
totals for each checklist or rank-order sub-question in
order to determine whether the general hypothetical
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relationship was apparent.

Where it was, statistical

analysis of both these types of questions focused upon
categorical frequencies.

In the case of checklist

questions, responses for each group were divided into two
sub-groups based upon whether the respondent had checked a
particular line (considered a "yes" response) or not
(considered a "no"); non-respondents were omitted from
analysis.

For rank-order questions, the number of

respondents who had assigned a specific rank to a particular
sub-question was measured against those who had not.
Following Siegel and Castellan (1988), the Chi-Square
(X2 ) test, corrected for continuity with the data cast into
a 2x2 contingency table, was used to test for differences
among groups.

Again, the considerably larger n of Group 2

required an asymmetrical approach to the testing.

Response

frequencies for each of the smaller groups were tested
against those of the largest group (Group 2).

Again, the

existence of significant differences between each of the
three smaller groups, an~ the larger group, was used as a
general indicator, while the lack of such differences was
considered to be evidence for acceptance of the null
hypothesis.

The mean was disregarded for this set of

analyses.
The contingency table used for analysis is presented in
Table 4.2.
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Table 4.~:
Contingency table for X2 analysis of response
frequencies.

Group 1, 3, or 4

Group 2

Frequency "no"

Cell "A"

Cell "B"

Frequency "yes"

Cell "C"

Cell "D"

The formula for the X2 test corrected for continuity is as
follows:
x2=

where

xz =

n(IAD-BCl-n/2) 2
(A+B) (C+D) (A+C) (B+D)

chi-square statistic

= total sample (both groups)
A, B, C, D = respective cell values
N

df = degrees of freedom = 1

(Siegel and Castellan 1988)
Siegel and Castellan's (1988) X2 table was used to determine
significance.

Again, differences were considered

statistically significant at the 95th percentile (a s

.OS);

a chi-square statistic of 3.84 or greater was considered
indicative of this level of significance (Siegel and
Castellan 1988).

Siegel and Castellan suggest that sparsity

rules only apply to a chi-square analysis where df > l;
therefore, the study treated zero values like any other for
purposes of analysis by means of the chi-square corrected
for continuity.
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IV·

c.

IV.

c•

Analysis.

1

•

Analysis of Likert-scale responses.

The hypothesized relationship was graphically apparent
in only one of the study's Likert - scale questions: Question
8.

Therefore, this was the only question where the Student-

t Test was used for hypothesis testing.

Question 8:

Respondents were asked to what extent they

thought the existing contamination of the Acushnet River was
a health risk.

Possible Likert-scale responses ranged from

o, "No current health risk," to 10, "Great current health
risk."

A score of 5 was marked "Moderate health risk."

Results and analysis are summarized in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Survey Question 8 -- Analysis of results.

Mean,
xme or µ

std

n

or

N

t

SS

@

.05?

ot =

Group 1

8.375

1 . 847

8

Group 2

7.561

2.250

82

Group 3

8.375

1.188

8

1.323

no

Group 4

9.000

1.826

7

1. 635

no

7.781

2.157

105

All

0.851

---

---

no
- -

-

---

Since analysis did not suggest the existence of
statistically significant differences (SSDs) among groups,
the research hypothesis was rejected and the null accepted
for Question 8.

Since this was the only one of the study's

Likert-scale questions which showed the hypothesized
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relationship graphically, the research hypothesis could be
rejected for all the survey's Likert-scale questions.

IV·

c.

2.

Analysis of frequency-based responses.

Examination of the survey's rank-order and checklist
responses revealed that, as in the case of the Likert-scale
responses, the hypothesized perceptual convergence of Groups
1 and 3 was not generally apparent.

The response to only

one checklist sub-question appeared to exhibit the
hypothesized relationship; this was analyzed by means of the

x2

test corrected for continuity.

Question 9f:

Question 9 asked respondents to identify those

groups whom they considered to be "at risk" from the
contamination at the New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site.

The

question made use of a checklist describing fourteen
different groupings of people, categorized primarily on the
basis of age, race, and geography.

The only one of these

fourteen sub-questions where the hypothesized relationship
was apparent was 9f, which listed "People who use boats."
summary of results and analysis, using the X2 test to
compare Groups 1, 3, and 4 with Group 2, is presented in
Table 4.4.
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A

Table 4.4: Question 9£ -- Analysis of results.

Freq
"no"

Freq.
"yes"

%

Group

Anal.

xz

"yes"

n

N

stat

Groupl

4

4

50.0%

8

Group2

45

39

46.4%

84

Group3

3

6

33.3%

9

Group4

1

6

14.3%

7

--

All

on

--

--

108

SS @
CX=.05

0.03
1

no

--

--

93

0.65

no

91

2.57

no

92

--

--

-

-

- -

the basis of the chi-square test corrected for

continuity, the research hypothesis was rejected and the
null accepted for Question 9f.

IV.

c.

3.

Rejection of major hypothesis.

The study's hypothetical relationship was graphically
apparent in the results of only two of the survey's
questions; therefore only these two (Questions 8 and 9f)
were tested statistically.

In neither case did statistical

testing support Hr, which hypothesized the existence of
statistically significant differences among groups.

The

research, therefore, rejected the major hypothesis, and in
so doing, accepted the null.

Participation in the

facilitated discussions chaired by the Massachusetts Off ice
of Dispute Resolution does not appear to have caused the
risk perceptions of citizens and managers, regarding the New
Bedford Harbor Superfund Site, to converge.
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IV· D.

An emergent relationship: Polarization.

Examination of survey response margin totals exposed a
relationship which appeared to be far more prevalent than
the hypothesized one.

This relationship may be described as

polarization of perception, and is in fact nearly the
opposite of the hypothetical relationship.

Polarization of

perception may be said to be present where Group 1 and Group
3 , the facilitated discussion participants,

are statistical

outliers at either end of the study's perceptual continuum.
schematically, this relationship may be represented as
follows:

Xme' Group

1

I------ S S D

Universal mean, µ
or Group 2

-------!-------

S S D

Xme' Group 3

---------!

The null and research hypotheses may be stated as
follows:
H0 :

It is hypothesized that there are no statistically
significant differences in the measured perceptions of
the three groups, regarding the hazards associated with
the New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site.

~:

It is hypothesized that there are statistically
significant differences in the measured perceptions of
the three groups, regarding the hazards associated with
the New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site.

The sub-hypotheses used to test for polarization were as
follows:
Sub-hYPothesis 1:
It is hypothesized that the perceptions
of Group 1 and Group 3, regarding the hazards
associated with the New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site
and its remediation, lie at either extreme of the
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perceptual continuum formed by the perceptions of all
four groups.
sub-hypothesis 2:
It is hypothesized that the perceptions
of Group 1, regarding the hazards associated with the
New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site and its remediation,
are different, to a statistically significant degree ,
from those of Group 2 (for frequency-based questions),
or from the universal mean, µ (for Likert-scale
questions) .
Sub-hypothesis 3:
It is hypothesized that the perceptions
of Group 3, regarding the hazards associated with the
New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site and its remediation,
are different, to a statistically significant degree,
from those of Group 2 (for frequency-based questions),
or from the universal mean, µ (for Likert-scale
questions) .

It will be noted that, again, µ and Group 2 were treated as,
if not the same, similar for purposes of analysis, since the
proportionally large n of Group 2 caused it to dominate the
study's statistical universe .
The method for testing the polarization hypothesis was
similar to that used to test the major hypothesis .

Again,

in order to validate the model, the research first examined
margin totals for the existence of the general polarized
relationship.

Where

thi~

relationship was graphically

apparent, statistical testing was undertaken to test for
significant differences.

Acceptance of the research

hypothesis required SSDs between Group 1 and the mean (or
its proxy, Group 2), as well as between Group 3 and the mean
(or, again, Group 2).

Though Group 4 was tested along with

the other groups, its statistical status was in fact
irrelevant to the search for polarization.
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of the three types of questions (Likert, checklist, and
rank-order) used in the survey's "core" section,
approximately 33% of Likert-scale questions (7 of 21) , 24%
of checklist sub-questions (9 of 38), and none of the rankorder sub-questions showed the general polarization
relationship.

Again, the Student-t Test was used to analyze

the results of the Likert-scale questions; the three smaller
groups were each tested for significant differences against
the universal mean, µ, dominated by Group 2.

If Group 1 and

Group 3 each showed statistically significant differences
from µ, then the model was considered validated, and Hr was
accepted.
Once again, frequency-based questions (rank-order and
checklist) were tested by means of the Chi-square test
corrected for continuity.

Each of the three smaller groups

was compared, statistically, with Group 2; where Group 1 and
3 were both found to be statistically different from Group
2,

~

was, again, accepted.

IV. D. 1.

Analysis of Likert-scale responses: Polarization.

Question 13:

Question 13 asked respondents to what extent

they thought the government's scientists actually knew about
the health risks related to the existing harbor
contamination.

O on the Likert scale was marked "They know

very little;" 5 was marked "They know something;" 10 was
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marked "They know a great deal."

Results and analysis are

presented in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5: Survey Question 13 -- Analysis of results .

......

Mean,
Xme or µ

std

n

or

N

SS

t
Oi

.05?

=

0.314

@

Group 1

6.750

2.493

8

Group 2

6.988

2.809

85

Group 3

7.889

1. 269

9

1. 879

no

Group 4

7.000

1. 826

7

0.067

no

All

7.046

2.630

109

no

---

--

---

---

-

statistical analysis of Question 13 did not support the
polarization model, since statistically significant
differences were not demonstrated.

The new research

hypothesis was therefore rejected, and the null accepted,
for Question 13.

Question 16:

Question 16 asked survey respondents their

measure of the acceptability of incineration as a way of
reducing the risks of the contaminated harbor.

O on the

Likert scale was marked "Completely unacceptable;" 5 was
marked "Not sure;" and 10 was marked "Completely
acceptable."

The existence of a polarized relationship

between Groups 1 and 3 was graphically apparent; however,
the relatively large standard deviation for Group 1
prevented the use of the t-Test to test for significance of
this group's responses.

Results and analysis follow in

Table 4 . 6.
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Table 4.6: Survey Question 16 -- Analysis of results.
r-

Mean,
or µ,

....-

xme

std

n

or

N

t

SS

ex

@

.05?

=

Group 1

2.500

4.071

8

---

-

Group 2

4.595

2.958

84

---

---

Group 3

8.556

1.590

9

6.737

yes

Group 4

4.571

3.552

7

0.136

no

4.769

3.222

108

---

---

t"""

All

--

The polarization model could not be demonstrated
statistically; the only statistically valid difference
evident was that between Group 3 and the statistical
universe.

The null was accepted.

Question 17:

This question asked respondents to rate the

risks of incinerating the contaminated harbor sediments,
using a Likert scale whereon 0 was marked "High risk;" 5 was
marked "Moderate risk;" and 10 represented "No risk."

Once

again, a polarized relationship between Groups 1 and 3 was
graphically apparent.

Since, however; the standard

deviation for Groups 1 and 2 were larger than the means for
those groups, the validity of statistical analysis using the
parametric t-Test was called into question.
results alone follow in Table 4.7.
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Therefore,

Table 4.7: Survey Question 17 -- Results.
r-

Mean,
or µ.

......

xme

std

n

or

t

SS

N

ot

@

.05?

=

Group 1

1.000

1.690

8

-

--

---

Group 2

2.917

2.909

84

---

---

Group 3

8.333

1.225

9

---

---

Group 4

3.286

2.289

7

---

---

All

3.250

3.130

108

-

--

---

r-

Inferences of statistical significance could not be drawn
from the results of Question 17; therefore, the null
hypothesis was once again accepted.

Question 20:

Question 20 asked respondents to what extent

they thought the government's scientists actually knew about
the health risks resulting from the proposed incineration of
the harbor sediments.

As in Question 13, O on the Likert

scale was marked "They know very little;" 5 was marked "They
know something;" 10 was marked "They know a great deal."
Results and analysis are presented in Table 4.8.
Table 4.8: Survey Question 20 -- Analysis of results.

Mean,
or µ.
Group

xme

n

std

or

N

SS

t
ot

.05?

1

5.000

2.726

8

Group 2

5.185

2.881

81

---

---

Group 3

7.778

2.636

9

2.500

yes

Group 4

6.000

2.582

7

0.524

no

5.448

2 . 892

105

All

105

0.435

=

@

---

no

---

Again, statistical analysis did not support the polarization
model, but did demonstrate Group 3 to be a statistical
outlier.

The null hypothesis was accepted.

Question 24:

This question asked respondents what they

thought would be the overall economic effect of USEPA's
proposed incineration on the Greater New Bedford area.

O on

the Likert scale was marked "Harmful economic effect ; " 5 was
marked "No economic effect;" 10 was marked "Positive
economic effect."

Results and analysis are presented in

Table 4.9.
Analysis of results.

Table 4.9: Survey Question 24

Mean,
or µ

std

Xme

or

N

SS

t
Ol

@

.05?

3.117

yes

2.795

83

---

---

6.222

1.563

9

2.228

no

4.143

1.215

7

1.710

no

4.991

2 . 644
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3.000

1.

Group 2

5.120

Group 3
Group 4

690

=

8

Group 1

All

n

---

-- -

The Student t-Test, applied to the results of Question 24,
showed Group 1 to be statistically different from the mean,
while Group 3 was not.

The new research hypothesis was thus

rejected, and the null accepted; the polarization model
appeared not to apply in this instance.

Question 39:

This question asked respondents whether a

"p roven ... technology"

(Likert score

"innovative ... technology"

=

10) or an

(Likert = 0) was preferable for
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cleaning up New Bedford Harbor, where a score of 5 indicated
equal importance for the two extremes.

Results and analysis

are presented in Table 4.10.
Table 4.10: Survey Question 39 -- Analysis of results.
r-

Mean,
or µ

xme

std

n

or

t

N

SS
Ci

.05?

=

Group 1

4.875

1.885

8

Group 2

5.468

4.785

79

Group 3

7.444

1.590

9

3.179

yes

Group 4

6.500

2.820

6

0.668

no

5.657

4.350

102

All

1.098

@

-

-

-

---

no
-

-

-

---

The research hypothesis could not be supported, since only
Group 3 could be shown to differ, statistically, from the
universal mean; the polarization model did not apply to the
results of Question 39.

Incidentally, the relatively large

standard deviation associated with Group 2 seemed to imply
that the public was largely ambivalent regarding the need
for a time-tested sediment clean-up technology.

Question 40:

Question 40 asked respondents to compare the

health risks stemming from the harbor contamination with
those from the proposed incineration, using a Likert scale
whereon O was marked "Incineration is greatest risk;" 5 was
marked "Equal risks;" and 10 was marked "Existing
contamination is greatest risk."

Standard deviations andµ

were too large to permit use of the t-Test; results alone
are therefore presented in Table 4.11.
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Table 4.11: Survey Question 40 -- Results.
i"""

Mean,
or µ

I""""

xme

std

n

or

t

N

SS
Ci

--

@

= .05?

---

Group 1

2.875

3.482

8

-

Group 2

6.543

9.818

81

---

-

Group 3

9.111

1.167

9

---

---

Group 4

7.500

3.332

6

---

-

All

6.538

8.833

104

--

r-

-

---

---

While no inferences may be drawn regarding statistical
significance of the results of Question 40, it may be noted
that the standard deviation for groups 1 and 2 was quite
large, while that for Group 3 was remarkably small.

This

seems to imply that the public remained deeply ambivalent
about the relative risks of contamination versus
incineration, whereas those Federal decisionmakers directly
involved in the site had no doubt that incineration was far
safer than forgoing cleanup of the contaminated harbor
sediments.

IV. D. 2.

Analysis of frequency-based responses:
Polarization.

An examination of margin totals suggested that the
results of a number of the survey's checklist questions
might fit the polarization model.

Where the polarized

relationship was initially apparent, statistical analysis
was undertaken using, once again, the X2 test corrected for
continuity.
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Question 9:

As mentioned earlier, Question 9 asked

respondents to identify whom they considered to be "at risk"
from the contamination at the New Bedford Harbor Superfund

site by checking from a list of fourteen demographic and
geographic categories. The polarization relationship
appeared in the responses to three of these sub-questions:

Question 9b: Question 9b specified "Old people" as a

possible category of individuals "at risk" from the harbor
contamination.

x2

A summary of results and analysis, using the

test to compare Groups 1, 3 ,. and 4 with Group 2

I

is

presented in Table 4.12.

Table 4.12: Question 9b -- Analysis of results.

xz
stat.

SS@cx
=.05

0.293

no

Freq
"no"

Freq.
"yes"

%

Group

Anal.

"yes"

n

N

Groupl

2

6

75

8

Group2

35

49

58.3

84

Group3

4

5

55.6

9

93

0.038

no

Group4

3

4

57.1

7

91

0.114

no

44

64

59.3

108

All

92

--

-

-

-

-

-

--

-

--

Clearly, the null hypothesis could be accepted in the case
of Question 9b: the polarized relationship was not
statistically significant.

Question 9d: Question 9d asked respondents whether they

considered themselves to be "at risk" from the harbor

109

contamination.

Results and analysis are presented in Table

4.13.

Table 4.13: Question 9d -- Analysis of results.

x2

Freq.
"no"

Freq.
"yes"

%

Group

Anal.

"yes"

n

N

Groupl

3

5

62 . 5

8

Group2

39

45

53 . 6

84

Group3

8

1

11.1

9

93

4.287

yes

Group4

5

2

28.6

7

91

0.771

no

All

55

53

49.1

108

92
--

--

stat .

SS @
Ol=.05

0.013

no

--

--

--

--

since the response of only one of the three smaller groups
showed a statistically significant difference from that of
the large random sample (Group 2), the null hypothesis was
once again accepted: it was concluded that the polarization
model did not apply to the results of Question 9d .

However,

Group 3 was, once again, demonstrated to be a statistical
outlier .

Question 9m: Question 9m asked respondents whether they

considered "All residents of Dartmouth" to be "at risk" from
the sediment contamination.

Results and analysis are

presented in Table 4.14.
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Table 4.14: Question 9m -- Analysis of results.

Freq
"no"

Freq.
"yes"

%

Group

Anal.

x2

"yes"

n

N

stat

SS@a
=.05

2

6

75

8

3.80

no

Group2

56

28

33.3

84

--

--

Group3

8

1

11.1

9

93

0.98

no

Group4

6

1

14.3

7

91

0.38

no

All

72

36

33.3

108

--

--

Groupl
i-

92
--

-

-

The lack of statistically significant differences among
group responses to Question 9m required that the null
hypothesis be accepted in this instance.

Question 10:

Question 10 asked respondents to choose from a

list of nine ailments in order to express what they
considered to be "the health risks of the current
contamination."

The responses to two of these nine sub-

questions appeared to fit the polarization model; thus
statistical testing, summarized in the tables below, was
undertaken.

Question lOa:

Question lOa presented "Cancer" as a possible

risk of the harbor contamination .
appear in Table 4 . 15.
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Results and analysis

Table 4.15: Question lOa -- Analysis of results.
r;--

Freq.
"no"

Freq.
"yes"

"yes"

Groupl

2

5

71. 4

7

Group2

18

62

77.5

80

Group3

0

9

100

9

Group4

1

6

85.7

7

21

82

79.6

103

I"'"

All

%

Group

Anal.

n

N

xi
stat.

87

SS @
0!=.05

0.01

no

-

--

89

1. 34

no

87

. 0007

no

--

--

-

-

-

--

The null hypothesis was accepted in this instance, as a
result of the lack of statistically significant differences
among group responses.

Question lOc:

Question lOc listed "Respiratory problems" as

a possible risk of the harbor contamination.

Results and

analysis are presented in Table 4.16.
Table 4.16: Question lOc -- Analysis of results.

Freq
"no"

Freq.
"yes"

%

Group

Anal.

xi

"yes"

n

N

stat

Groupl

1

6

85.7

7

Group2

23

57

71.2

80

Group3

7

2

22.2

9

89

6.65

yes

Group4

4

3

42.9

7

87

1. 28

no

35

68

66.0

103

-

--

All

87

--

--

SS @
0!=.05

0.15

no

--

--

-

Again, the research hypothesis was rejected, and the null
accepted, due to the lack of significant differences among
group responses to Question lOc.
sole statistical outlier.
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Group 3 was once again the

Question llf: Question 11 utilized a checklist naming six

possible pathways to ask respondents how health risks might
be transferred from the Superfund site to the population .
Of the six sub-questions, only one appeared to support the
polarized relationship: sub-question llf, which referred to
"Eating garden vegetables."

Results and analysis appear in

Table 4.17.
Table 4.17: Question 11£ -- Analysis of results.

Freq.
"no"

Freq.
"yes"

%

Group

Anal .

"yes"

n

N

Groupl

5

3

37.5

8

Group2

53

31

36.9

·84

Group3

8

1

11.1

9

Group4

6

1

14.3

7

All

72

36

33.3

108

92

x2
stat.

SS @
a=.05

0.122

no

--

--

93

1. 39

no

91

0.628

no

--

--

--

--

The null hypothesis was once again accepted for the results
of Question llf.

Question 26:

This question offered respondents a checklist

of eight possible outcomes of the government's clean-up of
New Bedford Harbor, asking them which results they would
prefer .

Three of the sub-questions which appeared to show

the polarized relationship were tested for significance;
analysis and results are summarized in the following tables.

Question 26a:

This sub-question asked whether respondents

would like to see the

11

Clean-up ... provide jobs. "
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Table 4.18: Question 26a -- Analysis of results.
r--

x2

Freq.
"no"

Freq.
"yes"

%

Group

Anal.

"yes"

n

N

Groupl

2

6

75

8

Group2

20

62

75.6

82

Group3

7

2

22.2

9

91

8.667

yes

Group4

1

5

83.3

6

88

0.005

no

30

75

71.4

105

All

stat.
0.154

90

--

--

--

--

SS @
Ol=.05
no

--

-

-

The null hypothesis was once again accepted; again, Group 3
appeared as a statistical outlier.

Question 26c:

This sub-question put forth "restore

commercial options of harbor" as a clean - up result.
Table 4.19: Question 26c -- Analysis of results.

Freq.
"no"

Freq.
"yes"

%

Group

Anal.

"yes"

n

N

Groupl

1

7

87.5

8

Group2

17

65

79.3

82

Group3

4

5

55.6

9

Group4

0

6

100

6

All

22

83

79.0

105

x2
stat.
0.009

90

SS @
Ol=.05
no

-

--

91

1.41

no

-88

0.498

no

--

--

--

--

-

Due to the inability of the analysis to show statistical
differences between the study groups and the universal mean,
the research hypothesis was rejected, and the null accepted,
for Question 26c .

Question 26e:

This sub-question asked whether respondents

would like to see the clean-up "enhance tourism."
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Table 4.20: Question 26e -- Analysis of results.
r-

Freq.
"no"

Freq.
"yes"

%
"yes"

Group

Anal.

n

N

Groupl

3

5

62.5

8

Group2

39

43

52.4

82

Group3

7

2

22.2

9

Group4

2

4

66.6

6

51

54

51.4

105

,...

I"'"'

All

xz
stat .

SS @
CX=.05

0.030

no

--

--

91

1.877

no

88

0.063

no

90

--

--

-

-

--

Again, the research hypothesis was rejected, and the null
accepted, for Question 26e, since none of the differences
between groups proved significant .
As a result of the foregoing analyses, it was concluded
that the polarization model was not present to a
statistically significant degree in any of the survey's
checklist questions.

Nor was polarization discernable in

the responses to any of the survey's rank-order questions .

IV. D. 3.

Summary of analysis: Polarization.

Though initially apparent in 33% · of the study's core
Likert-scale questions, the polarization model was not
statistically demonstrable in this category of question.

Of

the six Likert-scale questions which were analyzed
statistically, however, Group 3, the manager-participants,
proved to be a statistical outlier in three instances (50%)
Though initially apparent in 23.7% of the study's
checklist sub-questions , statistical analysis failed to
demonstrate existence of the polarization model for this
category of question, as well.
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Of the ten checklist sub-

questions analyzed statistically, Group 3 was a statistical
outlier in 33% of cases (3 of 10) .
The polarized relationship was not discernable in any
of the study's rank-order questions.
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IV· E.

Trust in government and expectation of benefits.

Besides looking at perceptions of risk regarding the
New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site and its remediation, the
survey attempted to measure respondents' degree of trust in
government, expectation of benefits resulting from the
superfund clean-up, and degree of knowledge regarding the
source of funds for the remediation.

With two exceptions

(Questions 13 and 20, discussed above), the responses to
questions pertaining to these issues supported neither the
hypothesized relationship nor the polarization model; thus
they were omitted from the foregoing analysis.

In order,

however, to complete the study, and to gain the most
thorough understanding of respondents' perceptions regarding
the New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site, this group of
questions was subjected to the same statistical analysis as
was used for the study's other Likert-scale questions.

This

step was undertaken in order to determine whether the
smaller groups,

(1, 3, and 4) differed from the universal

mean, dominated by the public random sample (Group 2).

IV. E. 1.

Trust in government decisionmaking.

Question 13:

Respondents were asked to what extent they

thought the government's scientists actually knew about the
health risks stemming from the existing harbor
contamination.

Question 13 was discussed above; results and
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analysis were presented in Table 4.5; no SSDs were
demonstrable.

Question 20:

Survey participants were asked how much they

thought USEPA's scientists ''really [knew]" about the health
risks of the proposed incineration.

Question 20 was

discussed above, and a summary of response and analysis
presented (Table 4.8).

Only Group 3 was statistically

different from the universal mean.

Question 21:

Participants were asked "to what extent" they

thought USEPA "[told] the public the truth" about the risks
of incineration.

The question utilized a Likert scale,

where 0 was labelled "They tell very little of the truth;" 5
was marked "They tell some of the truth," and 10 represented
"They tell the truth 100%."

Results and analysis are

summarized in Table 4.21.
Table 4.21: Survey Question 21 -- Results and analysis.

Mean,
or µ

xme

std

n

or

N

SS

t
Ol

=

@

.05?

Group 1

4.625

1.768

8

Group 2

4.329

2.807

82

Group 3

9.333

0.707

9

17.371

yes

Group 4

7.571

1.813

7

3.486

yes

4.991

2.987

106

All

0.548

no

-

--

-

--

--

Statistical analysis suggested that both professional groups
(3 and 4) were statistically dissimilar from the public
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random sample (Group 2), while the citizen-participants were
not.

Question 23:

This question asked survey participants how

well USEPA was working to protect the public health with
respect to the New Bedford Harbor Superfund.

The Likert

scale equated a value of O with "A poor job;" 5 with "An
o.K. job;" and 10 with "An excellent job."

Results and

analysis follow in Table 4.22.
Table 4.22: Survey Question 23 -- Results and analysis.
Mean,
or µ

xme

std

n

or

N

t

SS
Ci

=

@

.05?

Group 1

4.750

1.752

8

Group 2

3.099

2.107

81

Group 3

7.750

2.659

8

3.894

yes

Group 4

6.857

1.952

7

3.021

yes

3.836

2.581

104

All

1.380

no

-

--

-

--

--

In this instance, analysis showed that the professional
groups each differed, statistically, from the public random
sample, while the citizen-participant group (Group 1) did
not.

IV. E. 2.

Expectation of benefits from clean-up.

Question 22:

An attempt was made to gauge respondents'

expectation of benefits resulting from the Superfund cleanup of the Acushnet by asking "how clean, and how safe"
respondents expected the river to be when the clean-up was
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complete.

The question used a Likert scale on which 0 was

marked "As dirty and unsafe as before;" 3.5 was marked "Safe
for swimming;" 7.5 was marked "Fish will be edible;" and 10
was marked "Shellfish will be edible."

Response and

analysis are summarized in Table 4.23.
Table 4.23: Survey Question 22 -- Results and analysis.

Mean,
or µ

xme

std

n

t

N

SS
Ol

@

.05?

=

0.247

no

--

--

8

1.570

no

2.410

7

0.797

no

2.790

103

-

--

Group 1

3.500

1.512

8

Group 2

3.562

2.903

80

Group 3

5.250

2.712

Group 4

2.857
3.641

All

or

-

In this instance, no statistical differences could be
discerned among groups.

Question 29:

A different approach to measuring respondents'

expectations of Superfund clean-up benefits was used in
Questions 29 and 30, each of which asked a willingness-topay question regarding the harbor clean-up.

Question 29

asked respondents how much they would "personally" be
willing to pay to be sure that the Acushnet would be
restored to a state where "fish and shellfish were safe to
eat, and the river was safe for children to swim in."

A

Likert scale divided into ten increments was provided; these
were marked with dollar values ranging from O to "Over
$1000."

Standard deviations were generally too large to
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permit the use of the Student-t test; therefore, results
alone are presented in Table 4.24.
Table 4.24: Survey Question 29 -- Results.

Mean, Xme
or µ,
r-

std

n

or

N

t

SS
ot =

@

.05?

Group 1

683.33

376.39

6

--

--

Group 2

186.90

318.98

79

--

--

Group 3

116.67

68.31

6

--

--

Group 4

428.57

419.18

7

--

--

230.25

343.65

98

--

--

All

In spite of the study's inability to use statistical methods
in this instance, strong differences in mean willingness-top~y

by group were readily apparent.

The citizen-

participants (Group 1) placed the highest value, by far, on
a pristine Acushnet; non-participant managers (Group 4) also
valued such an outcome highly .

Notably, the managers who

participated in the facilitated discussions, Group 3, placed
the lowest value upon a pristine Acushnet, a mere 17% of
Group l's valuation; Group 3's valuation amounted to only
62.4% of that of the New Bedford Area's relatively poor
public, as represented by the study's stratified random
sample (Group 2).

Question 30:

This question was similar to Question 29, and

used an identical Likert scale, graduated from O to "Over
$1000.

11

Unlike the preceding question, however, Question 30

posited a scenario where the river was "no longer highly
contaminated, but still not safe enough to swim or fish.
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11

Again, due to large standard deviations, results are
expressed in Table 4.25 without test results.
Table 4.25: Survey Question 30 -- Results and analysis.

Mean,
or µ

x~

std

n

or

N

t

a

SS @
= .05?

Group 1

391.67

471.61

6

--

--

Group 2

26.71

45.91

80

--

--

Group 3

50.00

31.62

6

--

--

Group 4

181.43

220.79

7

--

--

61.18

157.42

99

--

--

~

All

Again, large differences between group means were apparent,
in spite of the inappropriateness of statistical analysis to
this set of responses.

In this instance, however, the

public random sample (Group 2) least valued the posited
outcome.
Within each group, there seemed to be a large
difference between the value placed on the Question 29
scenario, and that associated with Question 30's
hypothetical situation, though here, too, statistical
confirmation was not possible.

For Group 1, a cleaner river

was worth 57% of what the pristine river was worth; for
Group 2, the figure was less than 15%; and for both Group 3
and Group 4, the proportion was approximately 43%.

IV. E. 3.

Knowledge of source of funds.

The last survey question for which responses were
examined attempted to discern to what extent respondents
were aware of the sources of funding of the Superfund clean122

UP·

As mentioned in an earlier section, corporations

responsible for the contamination of New Bedford Harbor
(potentially responsible parties: PRPs) have agreed to
contribute $110 million toward the clean-up, although
superfund itself provided federal monies for the initial
investigations and planning, cost-recovery actions, etc.

Question 28:

Respondents were asked, simply,

for this [Superfund] cleanup?"

"Who will pay

Written responses were

divided into two sub-groups: those which recognized the
contribution of the PRPs, versus those which expressed a
belief that "government" or "the taxpayer" would bear the
entire burden.

Statistical testing for differences among

groups was then undertaken in the same manner as for all
other frequency-based responses, using the Chi-Square

(X 2 )

test corrected for continuity and cast into a 2x2
contingency table.

Results and analysis are summarized in

Table 4.26.
Table 4.26: Question 28

~-

Results and analysis.

x2

Freq.
"Tax"

Freq.
"PRP"

%

Group

Anal .

"PRP"

n

N

Groupl

1

6

85.7

7

Group2

44

17

27.9

61

Group3

0

9

100

9

70

14.52

yes

Group4

1

4

80.0

5

66

3.635

no

All

46

36

68

--

--

123

stat.

SS @
Ci=.05

6.981

yes

--

--

--

-

-

In this instance, the response of Group 3, like that of
Group 1, differed significantly from the response of Group
2.

It is notable that a large majority of the public random

sample, Group 2, expressed a lack of knowledge of the most
important source of funding for remediation of the New
Bedford Harbor Superfund Site.
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V.

v.

A.

Conclusions.

MaJ'or hypothesis.

The research has not supported the major hypothesis.
The study has concluded, therefore, that the facilitated
discussions held by the Massachusetts Office of Dispute
Resolution did not result in the convergence of risk
perceptions of citizens and managers regarding the New
Bedford Harbor Superfund Site.

On the basis of the

literature survey, the study had defined such a convergence
as a measure of the discussions' effectiveness in resolving
conflict at the Site.

In other words, the study showed that

the facilitated discussions were not effective, within the
definition of effectiveness adopted by the study.
This conclusion stands in contrast to the study's
initial, implicit assumption that the discussions were
indeed effective in resolving conflict at the New Bedford
Harbor Superfund Site.

It forces, therefore, a re-

assessment of this assumption.

A re-examination of the

course of events at the Site, in light of the knowledge that
perceptions between citizens and managers did not converge,
suggests that the facilitated discussions did not resolve
conflict at the New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site.
As a result of the communication which took place
within the discussions, prolonged legal action was clearly
averted, and USEPA abandoned its plans to incinerate the Hot
Spot sediments.

However, at the time of this writing,
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citizens and managers have yet to agree upon a specific
treatment method for the contaminated harbor sediments.

The

agreement to study the problem and search for alternative
treatment technologies has placated the citizen activists
and apparently given USEPA a sense that the cleanup is
somehow moving forward.

But until citizens and planners

agree upon a treatment method, a solution has not been
found.
In short, the citizens won, defeating the incineration
proposal through the medium of the facilitated discussions,
in spite of the lack of acceptable alternatives.

As the

study has shown, it would have been most difficult for them
to achieve a comparable result by means of legal action.

To

the extent the discussions have succeeded in averting
conflict, then, they seem to have done so by effectively
democratizing USEPA's Superfund decisionmaking process.

And

yet, when a plan which is years in the making is rejected in
spite of the lack of clear alternatives, one is left with
little wonder that Superfund has been found to be among the
least cost-effective of Federal environmental laws.
Having rejected its major hypothesis as well as an
implicit, but fundamental, assumption, it remains for this
study to examine the survey data more descriptively, in an
effort to understand the nature of the conflict over
remediation and the workings of the facilitated discussions
Within the context of public perceptions of the New Bedford
Harbor Superfund Site.
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v. a.

v.

Discussion of other findings.

B. 1.

Polarization.

Upon examination of means and frequencies of responses
to the survey's core questions, it appeared that a
polarization of perception between citizens and managers
engaged in the facilitated discussions might be
demonstrable.

Statistical analysis, however, failed to

support the existence of this model.

Polarization was

graphically apparent, if not statistically demonstrable, in
16 of the survey's 33 core questions (48%).

While the

necessarily small n of three of the four study groups
limited the ability of the statistical analyses to
distinguish subtler differences among groups, the graphic
prevalence of the polarization model suggests that it has
some meaning in describing the relationship among the study
groups.
If polarization of perceptions among citizens and
managers exists to some degree, the relationship offers an
explanation for the discussions' ability to avert, without
resolving, conflict at the New Bedford Harbor Superfund
Site.

The discussions appear to have engaged those groups

holding the most intense views on either side of the
controversy.

By bringing these diametrically opposed groups

to the table, the discussions brought them out of the public

fora--court~ooms, newspapers, and City Hall.
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And yet, these

groups--in fact a very small number of people--were those
least likely to ultimately agree to a specific solution.
The involvement of those citizens with the most
vehement views about incineration would seem to be the
direct result of the Office of Dispute Resolution's
inclusive approach to choosing discussion participants.

In

contrast, the earlier citizens' group, the New Bedford
community Work Group, appointed by the city's mayor,
satisfied CERCLA's public involvement provisions without
involving the citizens' groups which were most opposed to
USEPA's incineration plans.

To the extent, then, that the

polarization relationship may exist, it seems to suggest
that, by the time the facilitated discussions began, a chasm
of perception had developed between a small group of
citizens and the federal decisionmakers, regarding the
harbor Superfund site.

Arguably, the foundation of the

conflict over remediation of the New Bedford Harbor
Superfund site was laid at the outset of the CERCLA public
participation process, when USEPA and the City organized a
citizens' advisory group which failed to involve the most
passionate critics of the proposed incineration.

This is

an attractive conclusion, intuitively appealing; yet it must
be regarded cautiously due to the inability of the study to
show that the polarized relationship between citizens and
managers involved in the facilitated discussions existed to
a statistically significant degree.
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v.

B. 2.

Group 3 as statistical outlier.

rn its analyses of differences in risk perception among
the study groups, the study discovered only one trend for
which statistical significance could be substantiated.

This

relationship showed Group 3 (the manager-participants) to be
a statistical outlier: different from the study's universal
mean (for Likert-scale questions) or from Group 2
(frequency-based responses).

In 6 of the study's 11

analyses of Likert-scale questions (54%), Group 3 was a
statistical outlier; in 4 of these instances (35%)
the sole outlier.

it was

In 4 of the _ study's 11 analyses of

frequency-based questions (35%), Group 3 was a statistical
outlier; in two of these cases (10%) it was the sole
outlier.
Questions where Group 3 was a statistical outlier dealt
with a diversity of issues, including the risks of the
contamination (Questions 9d, lOc), the risks of the
incineration (Question 16), the goals and methods of the
clean-up (Questions 39 and 26a), and degree of trust in
government (Questions 20, 21, and 23).

The divergence of

the manager-participants' perceptions from those of the
public suggests two types of communicative failures on the
part of the government decisionmakers: failure to
communicate the risks of the site and the goals of the
clean-up to the clean-up's natural constituency, and failure
to incorporate the ideals of the community regarding the
cleanup into their own views of the situation.
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The goals of

a superfund cleanup are largely fixed by the law itself.
However, if site managers expect the support of a community,
they must communicate the benefits of those goals, and,
where possible, craft an implementation plan which works
toward satisfying community goals to the extent possible
while meeting the requirements of the law.
Perhaps the most interesting of these results are those
which show the perceptions of the Group 3 managers to be the
sole statistical outlier.

Here, the perceptions of the

manager-participants differ not only from those of the
citizens' groups but from those of the resource managers who
did not participate in the facilitated discussions.

This

suggests that Group 3's perceptual differences do not stem
solely from their professional orientation, but also from
the process of their involvement in decisionmaking, conflict
and dialogue at the Superfund Site.

V. B. 3.

Trust in government.

The study found that the public groups shared a
relatively low degree of trust in the ability of the
government to determine and deal with the problems arising
from the contamination and its remediation.

Responses to

Question 13 (Table 4.5) reflected cautious optimism
concerning the government's knowledge of the risks of the
site.

However, when asked how much the government's

scientists knew about the risks of the incineration
(Question 20, Table 4.8), mean Likert response of the public
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groups (Groups 1 and 2) rested at approximately 5, or "They
know something," where 10 represented "They know a great
deal."

Asked to what extent the government decisionmakers

"[told] the public the truth" about the risks of
incineration (Question 21, Table 4 . 21), mean response for
both public groups was even lower, in the 4.5 range, near
"They tell some of the truth."
A finding,

in 1994, of lack of trust in government

among the public will surprise no one.

However, this, too,

sheds light on the source of the controversy over
remediation of the New Bedford . Harbor Superfund Site.

If

citizens do not believe that the government can, or will,
accurately assess and communicate the risks attending its
environmental decisionmaking, they have no reason to support
it.

As rational actors under such circumstances, they will

"take the devil they know," or think they know (the
contaminated harbor) over the one that they do not
(incineration) .
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v.

B. 4.

Expectation of benefits.

Three of the survey's questions (22, 29, and 30)
examined respondents' expectation of benefits from the
harbor clean-up .

While analysis of Question 22

(Table 4.23)

found the response of Group 3 to be significantly higher
than that of the other groups, no group felt that fish in
the harbor, after clean-up, would be safe to eat; Group 2
expected the harbor to be just safe enough for swimming
(mean Likert score

=

3.6).

Clearly, public expectation of

water quality improvement as a result of the Superfund
project was low .
Perhaps a more insightful measure of public expectation
of benefits of the site is revealed by the comparison of
responses to Questions 29 and 30 (Tables 4.24 and 4.25).
Group 2 valued a pristine Acushnet at $186.90, compared with
$26.71 for a cleaner, but not useable,

river.

This seven-

fold difference is indicative, again, of low public
expectation of benefit resulting from the Superfund cleanup.
The consequences of these findings are similar to those
stemming from a finding of lack of trust in government.
Where local residents do not perceive a clear benefit
resulting from a potentially risky project, such as
incineration of the harbor sediments, they would be foolish
to support it.

If a governmental agency wishes to convince

a public that a project is necessary, it must communicate
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the advantages of that project to those who, presumably,
stand to benefit the most from it.

v.

B.

s.

Knowledge of source of funding.

Question 28 (Table 4.26) found a majority of the public
random sample (72% of Group 2) to be unaware of the $110
million contribution which the capacitor manufacturers made
toward the cost of the harbor clean-up.

This factor also

helps explain the cynicism and lack of support which the
public expressed toward the harbor clean-up.

Arguably, a

more widespread knowledge of the PRP settlement would impart
to the public a sense of justice: the ''polluter pays"
principle.

If, however, much of the public believes that

she, as a taxpayer, is being forced to pay for the
construction of a hazardous waste incinerator in her own
neighborhood, the sense of victimization is complete.
Again, the data are expressive of a failure in communication
on the part of environmental decisionmakers, contributing to
the conflict over remediation of the New Bedford Harbor
Superfund Site.
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v. c.

The New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site and the
reauthorization of CERCLA.

The study has demonstrated, unexpectedly, that the
facilitated discussions chaired by the Massachusetts Office
of Dispute Resolution regarding the New Bedford Harbor
superfund Site did not resolve conflict over the site, . where
such resolution is defined as a convergence of risk
perceptions.

Rather, it seems that the effect of the

discussions was to avert conflict by democratizing the
decisionmaking process and fostering communication among the
groups in opposition, without reconciling these groups'
differences regarding the risks and benefits of the site and
its cleanup.

The extent to which the discussions succeeded

in averting conflict appears to have been a function of
their involvement of those groups with the most widely
divergent views.
The study suggests that the public/governmental
conflict over remediation of the New Bedford Harbor
Superfund Site was caused, in part, by USEPA's failure to
communicate to the public the risks of the site or the
benefits of the proposed clean-up.

The study's legal

component has shown that easy solutions to such conflict are
not to be found in the courtroom, but that the facilitated
discussions in effect handed the group opposed to
incineration a result which they would have had difficulty
achieving in court.
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The proposals for CERCLA's reauthorization which were
considered by Congress in 1994 called for greatly expanded
public involvement in the Superfund decisionmaking process.
This study suggests that, to the extent that such a reform
might involve citizens in Superfund decisionmaking before
conflict arises, it holds promise for facilitating the
peaceful implementation of Superfund clean-up plans in the
future.

The results of the study suggest a caveat, as well:

that once conflict has arisen, improved public participation
may not solve the problem, but simply prolong and politicize
it.

Such situations can only worsen Superfund's well-

documented lack of cost-effectiveness.
The treatment of hazardous waste, generally, has proven
to be among the most difficult of problems in public
environmental policy.

The clean-up of Superfund sites,

therefore, will undoubtedly continue to generate
controversy, particularly among those who reside in the area
surrounding a proposed facility.

Communication between

government and citizens regarding such situations is fraught
with difficulty.

The issues are complex; risks and benefits

are uncertain; lack of trust in government is a tremendous
obstacle.

The entire public participation process is a

messy one.
And yet, as the New Bedford experience has shown, a
small group of citizens is capable of short-circuiting a
multi-million dollar remediation plan that ignores their
interests.

As glaringly imperfect as the process may be,
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public participation in Superfund decisionmaking which is,
in the words of the 1994 Senate Superfund reauthorization
bill,

''early, direct and meaningful" would seem to be, at

this point, society's best bet for overcoming conflict in
order to clean up contaminated sites successfully,
expeditiously, and democratically.

Local residents are the

natural constituents of an environmental clean-up; in order
to earn their support, environmental professionals should
endeavor to keep them informed of the most important aspects
of a project.

By paying due attention to the opinions of

local residents, as well, USEPA and other environmental
agencies may work toward avoiding prolonged conflicts of the
type which has attended the New Bedford Harbor Superfund
Site.
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Appendix A:

Initial perceptions of citizens and managers
drawn from Jan 5, 1994 facilitated
discussion.

The second of the series of facilitated discussions
regarding the New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site was held on
January 5, 1994, at the Greater New Bedford Vocational High
school.

At the request of the facilitator, Michael Keating,

each of the discussion participants expressed his or her
interests regarding the Site, in order for the group to
understand the criteria of all sides in the environmental
dispute.

Individual participants were:

Citizen Representatives:
Concerned Parents of Fairhaven
Claudia Kirk
Kathleen Rocha
Downwind Coalition
Neal Balboni
Diana Cabbold
Carol Sanz
Hands Across the River
Eugene Grace
David Hammond
James Simmons
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M.Vnicipal Officials:
&irhaven:
patrick Mullin
Jeff Osuch
ru::ushnet:
Roland Peppin
New Bedford -- Mayor's Office
Arthur Caron
New Bedford -- City Council
David Gerwatowski
Fred Kalisz
George Rogers

Professional Resource Managers
US Environmental Protection Agency
Frank Ciavatteri
Harley Laing
John McNeil
Massachussetts Department of Environmental Protection
(MADEP)
Paul Craffey
Jay Naparstek
Helen Waldorf
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The following is an analytical summary, compiled 31 May
1 994 1 of the major perceptual differences which emerged
between the citizen representatives and the professional
resource managers, gleaned from a videotape of the
proceedings in the collection of the New Bedford Public
Library.

This identification of issues and differences was

used to formulate the descriptive survey which serves as the
principle data-gathering tool for this study.
It must be mentioned that, during this discussion, the
elected officials stressed their alignment with the
citizens' groups, thereby validating the choice of this
research to combine elected officials with citizens for
purposes of analysis.

I.

Health risks associated with contamination v. risks of
incineration
A.

Citizens unconvinced of ambient risks of site;
note uncertainty of science, age of data (1988)
Managers express great implicit faith in accuracy
of risk assessment, relevance of State ambient
criteria.

B.

Citizens fearful of health risks resulting
directly from incineration: stack emmissions
(dioxin, furans, toxic metal particulate); solid
waste (toxic ash) .
Managers convinced that incineration will not
cause significant new health risk.

C.

Citizens fearful of hazards resulting indirectly
from incineration: risk of fire or explosion.
Managers express faith in efficacy of risk
management.
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I I.

Willingness to consider incineration
A.

Citizens strongly oppose incineration; believe
that emphasis of forum should be on finding
alternatives.
Managers:
Incineration remains a viable option;
cost of switch in technologies must be justified.

I II .

Economics of incineration and remediation
A.

Citizens believe hazardous waste incineration will
cause economic harm to tourism and property
values.
Managers believe that timely cleanup of Hot Spot
is key to economic revitalization of the harbor.

B.

Citizens: Stigma of incineration will be
permanent.
Managers:
Incineration will produce short-term
effect only.

IV .

Cost of remediation alternative
A.

Citizens : Public health is more important than
cost; managers seem too concerned with costs.
Managers: Public health is paramount but agencies
are obligated to contain cost, as well.

B.

Citizens: The safest and best alternative must be
found, in spite of existing decisions and
contracts.
Managers: Existing decisions are difficult and
expensive to change.

V.

Time scale of remediation
A.

Citizens stress need to take the time to make the
proper choice of a remediation alternative.
Managers express need to expedite the cleanup, to
reduce present risks.
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VI.

Trust in government decisionmaking
A.

Citizens: Agencies are not doing their job to
adequately protect health of residents: lack of
monitoring of PCB air emmissions from dredging;
lack of EPA concern with metals.
Managers: Human health and the environment are our
paramount concerns

B.

Citizens: Agencies have not adequately
facilitated public involvement: outreach,
education, response.
Managers express desire to work with the public,
to come to an agreement regarding cleanup of the
site.

c.

Citizens: Managers are creating negotiation
context which favors the chosen alternative, re
scheduling of dredging and availability of
technical assistance.
Managers express willingness to keep an open mind,
and consider alternatives.

VII.

Scientific uncertainty
A.

Citizens: Scientific uncertainty casts doubt on
incineration.
Managers: uncertainty favors incineration.

B.

Citizens express desire to consider innovative
technologies.
Managers express importance of relying on proven
technology.
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Appendix B:

Texts of coverletters and surveys.

contents:
B. 1.

Coverletter for administration of survey to public
random sample (Group 2), English.

B. 2.

Public version of survey (Groups 1 and 2),
English.

B. 3.

Coverletter for administration and public version
of survey (Group 2), Portuguese.

B. 4.

Public version of survey (Groups 1 and 2),
Portuguese.

B. 5.

Sample of personalized coverletter used to
administer survey to smaller groups (Groups 1, 3,
and 4) .

B. 6.

Survey questions specific to
(Groups 3 and 4) .
·
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profes~ional

groups

B· 1.

Coverletter for administration of survey to public
random sample (Group 2), English.

(Researcher name, affiliation and address)

New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site Survey

Dear Madam or Sir:
As you probably know, the sediments (mud) of the
Acushnet River are contaminated with high levels of PCBs
(polychlorinated biphenyls), particularly in the area north
of the Coggeshall St. Bridge, between the towns of New
Bedford and Acushnet. What to do about this contamination
has been the source of great controversy over the past
several years; the Federal Government, the State, and
citizens' groups have all gotten involved in this debate.
This is an opinion survey, from which we hope to learn
how you, personally, feel about this contaminated area of
the river, which the government calls the New Bedford Harbor
Superfund Site. We hope that this survey won't take more
than 15 minutes of your time.
Some of the questions may
seem irrelevant, but please answer them anyway. There are
no right or wrong answers; please read the questions
carefully, then answer them in the way that best reflects
your personal opinion.
The information which you provide will be kept
COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL. Your name will not be given to any
organization or company of any kind; you will not be put on
any mailing lists. The surveys will be destroyed once the
results are tabulated.
If you have any comments or questions about the survey,
or about individual questions, you may contact Dr. Niels
West, 401-792-2596, or the Vice Provost for Research, 70
Lower College Rd., University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI
02881, 401-792-2635.
Sincerely,
(Signed)
(Researcher name
and address)
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B. 2.

Public version of survey (Groups 1 and 2),
English.

SURVEY -Concerning the NEW BEDFORD HARBOR SUPERFUND SITE,
Upper Acushnet River, New Bedford, Massachusetts.
The following survey should take about 15 minutes to
complete.
Please read the questions carefully, and answer
them as completely and accurately as possible. THERE ARE NO
RIGHT OR WRONG ANSWERS. Your responses will be kept
COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL. Thank you for your time.
Date:
Town:
How long have you lived in the.New Bedford

area?-~

years.

What does this company do?

Did you know that there is a SUPERFUND SITE, that is, a
FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED HAZARDOUS WASTE SITE in the Acushnet
river?
Yes
No

1.

2.
If so, approximately how long have you known about this
site?
(Please check one)

Less than 6 months ... - - 6 months to 1 year ...
--1-2 years ........... .
--2-5 years ........... .
--More than 5 years .... - - 3.
Have you ever been active in any group or organization
which was concerned with this Superfund site?

No

Yes
4.

If "yes," please name the group

When, approximately, were you active in it?
(Month/Year) :

I

to
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I

s.
6.

Do you smoke cigarettes?
Yes

Sometimes

---

Do you wear a seatbelt when you drive?
Yes
Sometimes

No
No

7. What SOURCES OF INFORMATION are important to you,
concerning LOCAL events and controversies?
(Please CHECK all that apply.)
Radio
Television
Newspaper (please name)
Conversation with friends or neighbors, or at work
Children hear about things at school
Town meetings or public meetings
Other (Please write in) .

The rest of this survey asks about the New Bedford Harbor
Superfund Site and its clean-up.
Some of the questions make
use of a line, called a Likert scale, which symbolizes a
range of values between two opposite ideas.
PLEASE READ
EACH QUESTION CAREFULLY, THEN PLACE AN "X" anywhere along
the line, at the point which best reflects your judgement.
EXAMPLE
X.

In your opinion, what is a good day to go to the beach?
Cloudy
day only

Any
day

Sunny
day only

I----I----I----I----I----I----I-~--I----I----I----I

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

According to the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and the Massachusetts Department of
Environmental Protection (DEP), the Acushnet River is
CONTAMINATED WITH PCBS AND TOXIC METALS, particularly in the
area north of the Coggeshall St. bridge. The next six
questions relate to this CURRENT pollution problem.
Please
DO NOT consider EPA's recent dredging activities in making
your assessment.
In other words, "CURRENT" FOR THESE
PURPOSES MEANS IN THE LAST YEAR OR SO.
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8 . To what extent do you feel that the contamination of the
Acushnet River is a HEALTH RISK?
Moderate
health risk

No current
health risk

Great current
health risk

I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
9. Who would you say is AT RISK from this contamination?
(Please CHECK ALL that apply) .
children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - Old people . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _ __
Sick people . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - People who eat fish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - People who use boats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _ __
Portuguese people . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Non-Portuguese people . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - --Residents of the neighborhood where the pollution is
All residents of New Bedford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - All residents of Acushnet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - All residents of Fair Haven . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - All residents of Dartmouth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
All residents of Southeastern Massachusetts . . . . . . . . - - Other (Please write in)

-------------------

WHAT do you see as the health risks of the current
contamination?
(Please CHECK ALL that apply.)

10.

Cancer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - Skin problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - Respiratory problems ........ . - - Liver problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Heart trouble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - Leukemia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - Sexual problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - Kidney trouble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - Brain problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - Other (please write in) :
In your opinion, HOW might these risks be transferred
from the river to humans?
(Please CHECK ALL that apply)

11.

Bre a th'ing air
· ...... .
D'
.
1gg1ng
soil ....... . - - Eating fish ......... - - Other (please name)

Drinking water . . . . . . . . . . . - - Swimming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - Eating garden vegetables. - - -

-----------------------
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12. Are you a commercial fisherman, or are any of your
family or close friends commercial fishermen?
Yes
Relationship:
Immediate

Yourself~-

What kind of fishing?

No

family~-

Extended

family~-

Friend

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-

13. The Government (EPA) has completed studies which show
that the CONTAMINATION of the Acushnet is a real health risk
to local people.
In your opinion, how certain is this
assessment? In other words, HOW MUCH do you think that the
Government's scientists REALLY KNOW about the HEALTH RISKS
of this contamination?
They know
very little

They know
something

They know
a great deal

I- - --I----I----I----I----I - ---I----I----I----I----I
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
14. How did you, personally, learn about this contamination
problem and its risks?
(Please write in.)

In 1990, the EPA decided that the best way to SOLVE THE
PROBLEM OF PCB POLLUTION in the Acushnet River would be to
dredge the most contaminated sediments from the river and to
incinerate (burn) the sediments in a special incinerator.
This incinerator would have been temporarily assembled in
the North End of New Bedford.
Now, the
has been
CHOSEN.
polluted

dredging is under way but the incinerator decision
suspended while A NEW CLEAN-UP TECHNOLOGY IS
The next nine questions concern the CLEAN-UP of the
Acushnet River sediments.
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is. Do you think that it is SAFER TO HUMANS, AND BETTER FOR
THE ENVIRONMENT, for the EPA to REMOVE (dredge) the most
contaminated sediments from the Acushnet River, or to LEAVE
them in place?
Not
sure

Do not dredge
sediments

Dredge
sediments

I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I
0

1
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3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

16. As a way of REDUCING THE RISKS associated with the PCB
and metals contamination of the Acushnet River, INCINERATION
would be:
Completely
acceptable

Not
sure

Completely
unacceptable

I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I
0

1
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9

10

17.
How would you rate the HEALTH RISK OF INCINERATING PCBS
AND TOXIC METALS in the North End of New Bedford?

Extremely
risky

Moderate
risk

No
risk

I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

18. In terms of HEALTH RISKS, what specific aspects of
INCINERATION would most concern you?
(Please RANK 1 - 5,
where 1 is the most important, 5 is least important.)
Air pollution (respiratory disease)
Chance of fire
Toxic ash
Chance of explosion
Chance of spills or accidental releases
Other (Please name)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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19.
In terms of HEALTH RISKS FROM AIR EMMISSIONS
(SMOKESTACK) FROM THE INCINERATION, what possible RELEASES
would most concern you?
(Again, please RANK, 1 - 6, where 1 is most important, 6 is
least important.)
Dioxin
Heavy Metals (such as lead)
PCBs
Greenhouse gasses
Radiation
Other toxic chemicals
Other (Please name)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

20.
The Government's (EPA's) scientists have stated that
the INCINERATION would present LITTLE OR NO HEALTH RISK to
surrounding residents.
In your judgement, how much do the
scientists REALLY KNOW ABOUT THE HEALTH RISKS of this
incineration?

They know
a great deal

They know
something

They know
very little

I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

If the Government (EPA) does know about the r i sks of
incineration, to what extent do you think they TELL THE
PUBLIC THE TRUTH about such risks?

21.

They tell
very little
of the truth

They tell
some of
the truth

They tell
the truth
100%

I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

22.
HOW CLEAN, AND HOW SAFE, do you expect the Acushnet
River to be when the Government (EPA) is DONE CLEANING IT
UP?

As dirty &
unsafe as
before

Fish will
be edible

Safe for
swimming

Shellfish will
be edible

I----I----I----I- - --I----1----I----I----I----I----I
0

1

2

3

4

5

149

6

7

8

9

10

23.
In general, how GOOD A JOB is the Government (EPA)
doing to PROTECT THE HEALTH of the public as regards the New
Bedford Harbor Superfund Site?
A poor job

An

O.K. job

excellent job

An

I----I----I----I----I----I----I--- - I----I----I----I
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

24. What, in your opinion, would be the overall ECONOMIC
EFFECT of the proposed INCINERATOR on the Greater New
Bedford Area?
Beneficial
economic effect

No economic
effect

Harmful
economic effect

I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I
0
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25. What, in your opinion, would be the overall ECONOMIC
EFFECT on the Greater New Bedford Area of HAVING A CLEANER
HARBOR?
Positive
economic effect

Negative economic
effect

No economic
effect

I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I
0

1
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9
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26. WHAT WOULD YOU LIKE TO SEE regarding the harbor
cleanup? (Please CHECK ALL that apply) .
Clean-up
Clean-up
Clean-up
Clean-up
Clean-up
Clean-up
Clean-up

should
should
should
should
should
should
should

provide j~bs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . - - restore environment ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . .
--restore commercial options of harbor. - - enhance tourism ........ . ....... . .. . . .
--improve property values ........ . . . .. . - - make fish edible . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... .
not cost taxpayers money . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - -

Other (Please write in)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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There will always be some degree of trade-off between the
need to guarantee public health and safety, and the need to
find a cost-effective way of cleaning up the contamination
in New Bedford Harbor. The following questions concern the
COST OF CLEANING UP THE HARBOR, whether by incineration or
any other means. Regardless of the method finally chosen,
the cleanup of the harbor will cost many millions of
dollars.

27. What do you consider to be the BEST BALANCE between
assurance of PUBLIC HEALTH, and COST of cleanup.
Health
and cost
are equally
important

clean-up
must be as
inexpensive
as possible

Public health
is most important,
regardless of
cost

I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I
0
1
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4
5
6
7
8
9
10
28.

Who will pay for this cleanup?

29. How much would you, personally, be WILLING TO PAY IF
YOU COULD BE SURE that the Acushnet river would be cleaned
to the point where FISH AND SHELLFISH WERE SAFE TO EAT, and
the river was SAFE FOR CHILDREN TO SWIM in?
One-time payment, in dollars:
I----I----I----I----I----I----I--~-I----I----I----I

0

$1

$5

$10

$20

$50

$100 $200 $500 $1000

Over
$1000

30. How much would you, personally, be WILLING TO PAY IF
YOU COULD BE SURE that the Acushnet river would be cleaned
to the point where it was NO LONGER HIGHLY CONTAMINATED, but
still NOT SAFE ENOUGH TO SWIM OR FISH?
One-time payment, in dollars:
I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I
O
$1
$5 $10 $20 $50 $100 $200 $500 $1000 Over
$1000
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3 1. In your opinion, has the Government (EPA) done a GOOD
JOB OF INFORMING THE PUBLIC about the CURRENT RISKS of the
New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site on the Acushnet River?
O.K.
job

Poor
job

Excellent
job

I----I----I----I----I----I----I--- - I----I----I----I
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In your opinion, has the Government (EPA) done a good
job of INFORMING THE PUBLIC about its PROPOSED CLEANUP of
the Acushnet River sediments?
32.

Excellent
job

O.K.
job

Poor
job

I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I
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33.
In your opinion, has the Government (EPA) done a good
job of LISTENING TO THE PUBLIC about the Superfund Site and
its cleanup?
O.K.
job

Poor
job

Excellent
job

I----I----I----I----I--- - I----I----I----I----I----I
0
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34.
In your opinion, to what extent would the Government
(EPA) LET PUBLIC OPINION INFLUENCE ITS DECISIONS regarding
the Superfund Site and its cleanup? In other words, HOW
MUCH OF A SAY does the local public really have in the
Government's decisions?
Public
has no
say

Public has
moderate
say

Public
has
great say

I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I
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5
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35. What could the Government have done to IMPROVE THE
PROCESS OF PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT at the New Bedford Harbor
superfund Site?
(Please RANK 1 - 7, where 1 is the most
important, 7 is the least important.)
More public meetings
Radio & television spots
More programs in schools
More newspaper coverage
Door to door information campaign
Mailings
Other (Please write in)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-

Dealing with scientific uncertainty is part of any Superfund
clean-up. The next five questions relate to this
uncertainty, in the context of Superfund decisionmaking in
New Bedford Harbor.
36.
Given that SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY must be a reality of
decisions regarding the New Bedford Harbor Superfund Site,
do you think that the uncertainty -- the doubt -- about the
risks FAVORS THE CLEANUP, or FAVORS LEAVING THE SITE AS-IS?

Leave site
as-is.

Not
sure

Clean up
the site.
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37.
In your opinion, how important is it to HURRY THE
CLEANUP of the harbor along?

Time scale
is
unimportant

Moderate
delays
acceptable

Site must
be cleaned up
immediately

I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I
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38.
Please explain briefly the factors influencing your
judgement on Question 36:
I

I
I
I
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39. Again, given that there is scientific uncertainty
regarding both the risks of the contamination and the risk
of the cleanup, how should we deal with SCIENTIFIC
UNCERTAINTY in CHOOSING A CLEANUP METHOD for New Bedford
Harbor?
The two are
equally
important

Need a proven,
time-tested
technology

Need an
innovative
technology

I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I
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40.
In conclusion, do you feel that it would be a GREATER
HEALTH RISK to LEAVE the contaminated Acushnet sediments
where they currently sit, or to TREAT THEM BY INCINERATION?
Existing
contamination
is greatest risk

Incineration
is greatest
risk

Equal
risks

I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I
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B. 3.

Coverletter for administration of survey to public
random sample (Group 2), Portuguese.

P 0 R T U G U E S

Questionario de o Porto de New Bedford

Estimado Senhora ou Senhor:
Como voce provavelmente sabe, os sedimentos (lodos) do rio
Acushnet estao contaminados com altos niveles de PBC (PCBs
ou bifenilos polyclorinados), especialmente na area norte da
ponte do Caminho Coggeshall (Coggeshall St. Bridge) . Esta
contaminacao tern sido uma funte de contravencao, duranto os
ultimos anos.
O Governo Federal, e o estado de
Massachusetts, e varios grupos locales tern tentado resolver
este problema.
Este questionario e para voce poder dar a sua opiniao, da
area que o Governo Federal chama o "New Bedford Harbor
Superfund Site." Nos esperamos que este questinario no leve
mais de que 15 minutes para complitar. Estas preguntas sao
para voce dar a sua opiniao, emtam nao a uma resposta que e
mais certa de que outra.
Por favor complete todas as
preguntos.
Como voce vive na area que esta contaminado nos queremos
saber sua opiniao. A suas respostas as preguntas que nos
preguntamos vao ser CONFIDENCIAL. Depois de obter a
informacao, nos vamos destruir os questionarios.
Se voce tern alguma pregunta por favor entre en contacto com
nos.
Pode conversar com Dr. Niels West, 401-792-2596 o com
o Vice Preboste de Investigacao, 70 Lower College Rd.,
University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI 02881, 401-7922635. Eu agradeco sua ajuda.
Obrigado,
(Signed)
(Researcher name
and affiliation)
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B. 4 ·

Public version of survey (Groups 1 and 2),
Portuguese.
QUESTIONARIO

Acerca do
PORTO DO NEW BEDFORD

Este questionario deve levar 15 minutes para completar.
Por
favor leia cada pregunta cuidadosamente, e responda
completamente. NAO A RESPOSTAS CORRECTAS OU ERRADAS.
Suas
respostas sera confidencial.

---------------------------------------------------------

Nome:
Data:
Endereco:
Cidade:
A quanto tempo vive cerca New Bedford?
anos
Empregador: ___________________________
Posiciao:
Que faz essa companhia?

----------------------------

Sabes que existe um SUPERFUND SITIO
PERIGOSA)
no rio de Acushnet?
Sim

1.

(CONTAMINACAO
Nao

2.
Se sua resposta e positiva, A QUANTO TEMPO JA SABE deste
sitio? (Escolha um)
Menos de que 6 mezes ...... ____
Entre 6 mezes e um ano ... .
---1 - 2 anos ................ ____
2 - 5 anos ............. .. . .
---Mais de que 5 anos ........ . - - - -

La participaste num grupo que occupa-se de este asunto do
"Superfund Site?"
Sim
Nao

3.

4.

Se a resposta e positiva qual e o nome do groupo:

Quando partisipaste neste groupo?
(Mez/Ano)
5.

Furna cigarettes?

Sim

! __ ate _ _ ! __
As vezes

Nao

6. Fez uso do cinto de seguranca cuando guia um automovel?

Sim

Nao

As vezes
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7.
Como e que recebe sua INFORMACAO sabre eventos LOCALES?
(Marca todos que aplicam)
Radio
Television
Journal ( qual)
Conversa com amigos o vecinos, o no trabalho
Filhos aprendem na escola
Reuniaos publicas
Otras formas (escrevaque tipo)
Qual e MAIS IMPORTANTE?
segunde mais importante
As seguintes preguntas sao dirigidas a o projecto "Superfund
Site" no porto de New Bedford. Umas das preguntas faz uso do
"Likert Scale" para symbolizar o disposto de valor entre duas
situacaos. Marca com um "X."
E X E M P L 0

X.

Em sua opiniao, qual e o melhor dia para ir a praia?
Dia de
sol

Qualquer
dia

Dia
nubrado

I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I
0

1

2

3

4

De acordo com a Agencia
Departamento do Ambiente de
est a contaminado com altos
toxicos.
Nao considera as
ultimo ano.
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de Proteccao do Ambiente, e o
Massachusetts, o rio de Acushnet
ni vels de PBC ( PCBs) e metales
actividades de limpeza duranto o

8. A qual grau de valor voce pensa que a comtaminaciao do rio
Acushnet representa PERIGO A SAUDE?
Nao e perigo
corrente

Perigo
mediano

Grande

:p=rigo

I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I
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9.
Em. sua opiniao quern
comtaminacao?
(Marca todos que aplicam)

e

que

esta

em

prigodo

desta

criancas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... .
Gente de idade maior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ------Gente duente . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... .
A ti proprio ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ---Gente quern come peixe .................. . .... . ... . ... . ---Gente que usam barcos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . ---Os Portugueses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ---Quern nao e Portugues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ------A gente que vive na area que esta comtaminada ... . .... ____
Todos que vivem em New Bedford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .
Todos que vivem em Acushnet ............ . ............ . ---Todos que vivem em Fair Haven ........... . ........... . ---Todos que vivem em Dartmouth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ---Todos que vivem sul este de Massachusetts ...... . .... . ----

----

Otra gente (por favor escreva)
10. Em sua opiniao, qual sao os perigos da comtaminacao?
(Marca todos que aplicam)
Cancero ...... . ........ . - - - Doencas da pel ........ . - - - Problemas respiratorios - - - Problemas do figado .... - - - Problemas do coracao ...

Leukemia .......... . .
Problemas sexual es .. - - - Problemas das rimes.
Problemas do cerebro____

----

Otros problemas (por favor escreva)
11 .
Na sua opiniao, COME e que estes perigos podem ser
transferidos do rio a humanos?
(Marca todos que aplicam)
Respirando oar .... - - - Cavando a terra ....
Comendo piexe ..... . -------

Bebendo agua ......... . .. . - - - Passar a nadar .......... . ...,.---Comendo vegetales do j ardim_ _

Otras formas (por favor escreva)
12.

Es um piscador comercial, ou alguem da tua familia?
Sim
Nao

Relacao:

Tu mesmo
Familia ----

----

Familia proxima- - - Amigos

----

Que tipo de pesca?
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13.
0 Govervo (EPA) fez imvastigacaos que indicarao que a
coMTAMlNACAO do rio Acushnet representa um perigo a o povo
local. Em sua opiniao, QUANTO SABE o governo dos perigos que
existe no rio?
sabem
Sabem
Sabem
muito poco
poco
muito
l----l----1----1----l----l----l----I----l----l----l
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Como e que voce informo-se dos PERlGOS e da comtaminacao?

Em 1990, o Governo (EPA) decidio que a melhor forma para
RESOLVER 0 PROBLEMA DA COMTAMlNACAO do rio era para tirar, e
queimar os sedimentos.
0 forno de incineracao era para ser
construido temperiamente em o Norte de New Bedford.
Agora a limpeza continua, mais o forno de incineracao AlNDA
NAO FOl CONSTRUlDO.
As preguntas que siguem sao dirigidas
limpeza do Rio.
15. En sua opiniao, acha que a limpeza do Rio TEM BENEFlClOS
PARA TODOS, E PARA 0 AMBlENTE, ou deve o Governo (EPA) deixar
todo como esta?
Tirar
os sedimentos
do Rio

Diexe
os sedimentos
f icar

Nao f az
diferenca

l----l----l----l----I----1----1----l----l----l----l
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16.
Da perspectiva da sua saude, acha que incinerar os PBC
(PBCs) e metales e:
Totalmente
inaceitavel

Nao estou
seguro

Totalmente
aceitavel

l----l----l----l----l----l----l----1----1----l----l
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17. Referir-se A SAUDE, corno rnedes os PERIGOS DE QUEIMAR os
corntarninante em o Norte de New Bedford?
Nao a
perigoso

Pou co

Muito

perigo

I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I
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18. Referir-se A SAUDE, qual ea RAZAO que voce nao aceita o
forno de INCINERACAO?
(Maree de 1 -- rnais irnportante, a 5 -menos irnportante)
Problernas respiratorios
Perigo de f ogo
Cinzas toxicas
Explosaos
Derrarnos toxicos
Otra razao
(Qual)
19.
REFERIR-SE A SAUDE, qual das DESCARGOS DA CHAMINE te
preocupa?
(Maree de 1 -- rnais irnportante, a 6 -- rnenos irnportante)
Dioxin
Metales pesados (tales corno plorno)
PBC (PBCs)
Gases do efeito invernado (greenhouse gasses)
Radiaciao
Otros quirnicos toxicos
Otras (Qual)
20.
O Governo indica que o forno de incineracao e seguro.
QUANTO achas que o Governo (EPA) REALMENTE SABE SOBRE 0 PERIGO
do f orno de incineracao?
Sabe rnuito
pouco

Sabe
pouco

Sabe
rnuito

I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I
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21. Seo Governo (EPA) sabe dos perigos, QUANTO ACHAS QUE DIZ
ou povo?
Nao dizern
nada

Dizern
pouco

Dizern
100%

I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I
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22.

Achas que o Rio vai ficar?

Como estava
antes
(perigoso)

De f orma
de poder
nadar

De f orma
de poder
piscar para
comer

De f orma
de poder
comer os
mariscos

I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I
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23. Achas que o Governo (EPA) esta protegimdo a saude do povo
da contaminacao?
Mais o menos

Nao

Excelente

I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I
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24.
Em sua opiniao, qual sera o EFEITO ECONOMICO de ter o
forno de incineracao na area de New Bedford?
Efeito
economico
negative

Ningum
efeito
economico

EEeit.cs

ec:nnanico
p:>sitivo

I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I
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25. Em sua opiniao, qual sera o EFEITO ECONOMICO na area de
New Bedford de ter o RIO LIMPO?
Efeito
economico
negative

Ningum
efeito
economico

Efeit.cs

ec:nnanico
p:>sitivo

I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I
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26.
Que gustarias de ver associado com a limpeza do Rio?
(Marca todos que aplicam)
A
A
A
A
A
A
A

limpeza
limpeza
limpeza
limpeza
limpeza
limpeza
limpeza

devia
devia
devia
devia
devia
devia
devia

de
de
de
de
de
de
de

produzir trabalos .... .. ............ . - - restorar o ambiante .. . ............ . . - - restorar o comerco da area ....... . . . - - proteguir a saude do povo da area ...
melhorar o valor da propriedade .. . .. - - pirmitir o comsume do peixe . ....... . - - nao levantar os impostas ........... . - - -

---

Otras (Por favor escreva)
sempre existe um grau de compromisso entre a necesidade de uma
garantia para a saude, e a seguridade publica, asim como a
necesidade de encontrar uma maneira efeitiva de limpar a
comtaminacao do Porto de New Bedford. As siguintes preguntas
sao dirigidas ou PRECO DE LIMPAR O RIO. De todas as formas a
limpeza vai custar milhoes de dolaras.

27. Que opinas e o MELHOR BALANCO entre a GARANTIA DA SAUDE
e o PRECO DA LIMPEZA?
A limpeza deve
ser o mais
barato possivel

A saude e o preco
sao egual de
importancia

A saude publica
e o mais
importante

I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I
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28.

Quern deve pagar para esta limpeza?

29.
QUANTO PAGARAS PAR TER A CERTEZA que o Rio vai ser bem
limpo, e que se pode COMER MARISCOS E PEIXE, e tambem as
CRIANCAS PODEM NADAR no Rio?
So uma vez (dolaras) :
I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I
O
$1
$5 $10 $20 $50 $100 $200 $500 $1000 Sobre
$1000
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30. QUANTO PAGARAS PARA TERA CERTEZA que o Rio vai ser bem
limpo, e que nao teija comtaminado e nao e seguro para nadar
ou pescar?
so uma vez (dolaras) :
I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I
O
$1
$5 $10 $20 $50 $100 $200 $500 $1000 Sobre
$1000
31.
Em sua opiniao, o PERIGO
POBLICADO por o Governo (EPA)?
Nao

DA

Mais o menos

COMTAMINACAO

foi

BEM

Excelente

I----I----I----I----I-- - -I----I----I----I----I----I
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3 2 . Em sua opiniao, o Governo - (EPA)
LIMPEZA do Rio?
Nao

Mais o menos

INFORMOU BEM 0 POVO da
Excelente

I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I-- - -I--- - I
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33. Em sua opiniao, o Governo (EPA) PRESTO ATENCAO A OPINIAO
PUBLICA acerca da comtaminacao e a limpeza?
Nao

Mais o menos

Excelente

I----I - ---I--- - I----I----I----I 7- --I----I - ---I - ---I
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34. Em sua opiniao, ACHAS QUE 0 POVO LOCAL TEVE ALGUM PODER
em que o Governo (EPA) vai fazer com a limpeza do Rio?
Pou co

Mais o menos

Mui to

I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I--- - I
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35. Que podia ter feito o Governo (EPA) para INCLUIR O POVO
NO PROGREDIMENTO da limpeza do Rio?
(Marca de 1 - 7. 1 mais
importante; 7 menos importante)
Mais renioes publicas
Anuncios no radio e TV
Mais programas nas escolas
Mais anuncios no jornal
Inf ormacao de porta a porta
Correia
Otras formas (Por favor escreva)
As preguntas que siguem sao dirigidas a duvida do Governo
(EPA) na limpeza do Rio.
36. Sem os resoltados ser domostrados na limpeza do Porto de
New Bedford, achas que o Governo deve limpar o Rio ou deixarlo como esta?
Deixa
com esta

Em favor
da limpeza

Nao esta
seguro

I----I----r----r----I----r----r----I----r----I----I
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Em sua opiniao, o Rio deve ser limpo apressadamente?

O tempo
nao e
importante

Demore moderade
se pode
aceitar

Deve ser
limpo
imediatamente

I----I----I----r----r----I----r~---I----I----r----I

0

1

38.
Qual sao
pregunta 36.

2

3

os

4

fatores

5

que
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6

influio

7

8

a

sua

9

10

resposta

na

39. Otra vez, referindonos a os trabalhos cientificos que NAO
DAO CERTEZA DO PERIGO QUE EXISTE em limpar o Rio, como devemos
escolher o sistema de limpar o Porto de New Bedford?
Com uma
tecnologia
provada

As duas
sao
importante

Necesitarros
uma nova
tecnologia

I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I
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40. Em conclusao, achas que DEIXAR os comtaminentos no Rio E
MAIS PERIGOSO, ou QUEIMARLOS NO FORNO DE INCINERACAO DA MAIS
PERIGO?
A comtaminacao
e o perigo
maior

Equal

Incineracao
e o perigo
maior

I----I----I----I----I----1----I----I----I----I----I
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B. 5.

Sample
of
personalized
coverletter
used
administer survey to smaller groups (Groups 1,
and 4}.

to
3,

(Subject name and address)
5 October 1994
Dear Marguerite:
Enclosed are copies of the survey which we discussed by
telephone this week, along with a couple of return envelopes.
I realize how busy you are; thanks for agreeing to take the
time to participate in this study.
If some of the questions seem rather basic, please bear
with me; parts of this survey are being administered to a
broad cross-section of people, not all of whom are likely to
be as familiar with this type of site as you are.
I don't
think the survey will take any more than 15 minutes of your
time. There are, of course, no right or wrong answers; please
read the questions carefully, then answer them in the way that
best reflects your personal opinion.
I am not interested in
official statements or agency positions, but rather, would
like to know how you, personally, perceive this situation .
The information which you provide will be kept completely
confidential. The surveys will be destroyed once the results
are tabulated. Again, I realize the demands of your schedule,
but would be most appreciative if you were able to return the
survey within a week or two.
If you have any comments, questions, or complaints about
the survey, you may contact myself; . my advisor, Dr. Niels
West, 401-792-2596; or the Vice Provost for Research, 70 Lower
College Rd., University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI 02881,
401-792-2635. Thank you; I look forward to your response.
Sincerely,
(Researcher name,
affiliation, and
address)
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B. 6.

Survey questions specific
(Groups 3 and 4) .

to professional

groups

SURVEY -Concerning the NEW BEDFORD HARBOR SUPERFUND SITE,
Upper Acushnet River, New Bedford, Massachusetts.
The following survey should take about 15 minutes to complete.
Please read each question carefully, then answer them as
completely and accurately as possible. There are no right or
wrong answers; please note that I am looking for your personal
opinion, not an official agency or departmental position.
Your responses will be kept completely confidential .
Thank
you for your time .

Date: - --

---

Have you lived in the New Bedford area?
If so, for how long?

1.
How °long have you
environmental management?

years

been

involved,
years

generally,

in

2. In working on a particular site, how often, on average, do
you converse with non-professionals
stakeholders
interested in a site?
(Please CHECK ONE.)
At least once a day ........ . - - Several times per week . . ... .
Once a week .... ... . .... .. ... - - Several times per month .. . . .
Once a month ................ - - Less than once a month ..... . - - Varies too much to say ..... . - - -
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3.
Please characterize your role in site management by
RANKING the following, where 1 is the most important, 5 is
least.
Managerial
Technical
Legal
Public information
Other (Please write in)
4.

Do you smoke cigarettes?
Yes

5.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Sometimes- - -

No

Do you wear a seatbelt when you drive?
Yes

Sometimes- - -

No

The rest of this survey asks about the New Bedford Harbor
Superfund Site and its clean-up.
Some of the questions make
use of a line, called a Likert scale, which symbolizes a range
of values between two opposite ideas.
PLEASE READ EACH
QUESTION CAREFULLY, THEN PLACE AN "X" anywhere along the line,
at the point which best reflects your judgement.
EXAMPLE
X.

In your opinion, what is a good day to go to the beach?
Cloudy
day only

Any
day

Sunny
day only

I----I----I----I----I----I----I-~--I----I----I----I
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6. Regarding governmental environmental management decisions,
do you feel that public involvement is, in general, a help or
a hindrance to the sound execution of a project? (Please mark
scale where appropriate.)
Hindrance

Does not
matter

Help

I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I----I
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7 . As you know, the federal Superfund law (CERCLA) is up for
reauthorization this year or next. All else being equal, do
you think that Superfund's public involvement mandate should
be increased or decreased in this revision?
Increase

Keep it
the same

Decrease

I----l----1----1----I----l - ---I----I----I----I----I
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Appendix C:

List of Acronyms

ADR:

Alternative dispute resolution.

APA:

Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. Section 701 et

~

ATSDR:

US Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry.

ARARs: Applicable and relevant or appropriate requirements.
CDF: Confined disposal facility.
CERCLA: Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act of 1980, amended in 1986 by SARA. 42 U.S.C.
Sections 9601 et seq.
C.F.R.:
CPFH:

Code of Federal Regulations.
Concerned Parents of Fair Haven.

CWA: Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C .. 1251 et seq.
cy:

Cubic yard.

DC:

Downwind Coalition.

DRE:

Dioxin removal efficiency.

EIS:

Environmental impact statement.

ESD:

Explanation of significant differences.

FS:

Feasibility study.

FFA:

Federal Facilities Agreement.

GNBCWG:
HATR:
HRS:

Greater New Bedford Community Work Group.
Hands Across the River.

Hazard Ranking System.

HSPP:

Hot Spot Proposed Plan.

LULU:

Locally unwanted land use .

NEPA: National Environmental Policy Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.
4321 et
seq .
NIMBY:
NOAA:

Not in my back yard.
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

NPL: National Priorities List.
PAHs:
Polyaromatic hydrocarbons.
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PCBs:

Polychlorinated biphenols.

ppm:

Parts per million.

PRP:

Potentially responsible party.

RA:

Risk assessment.

RI:

Remedial investigation.

RAMP:

Remedial Action Master Plan.

RCRA: Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.
6901 et
~
ROD:

Record of Decision.

SARA: Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986,
42
U.S.C. Sections 9601 et seq.
SS:

Statistically significant.

SSD:

Statistically significant difference.

TAG:

Technical advisory grant.

TSCA:
Toxic Substances and Control Act of 1976,
Sections 2601 et seq.
U.S.C.:

United States Code.

USDOE:

US Department of Energy.

USEPA:

US Environmental Protection Agency.

USGS:

US Geological Survey.
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